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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis will examine the liability of health authorities under the Human Rights Act 
1998 in relation to the Article 2 positive operational duty under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The decision in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust has 
expanded the scope of the operational duty and has raised issues that have been left 
undecided. Firstly, to properly understand the operational duty, the relationship 
between it and the Article 2 investigatory duty will be considered. It will then 
concentrate on the operational duty and the impact of using vulnerability to trigger the 
duty. It will define vulnerability and will show that a duty based on vulnerability can 
still be applied narrowly and effectively.  Finally, although the primary focus will be 
on the Article 2 positive operational duties, the liability of public authorities in 
negligence for breach of a positive duty of care will be considered, as despite the 
current judicial emphasis on the separation of the two actions, there are a number of 
overlaps. It will be argued that these similarities mean that the two causes of action 
should be more consistent at the duty stage, but should remain separate where breach 
and remedies are concerned. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the positive operational duties of health 
authorities under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Article 2(1) states that ‘[e]veryone’s  right to life shall be protected by law’.1 It 
creates a negative duty not to take life, as well as imposing certain positive 
obligations to protect life. There are three forms that these positive obligations can 
take: i) the investigatory duty, ii) the general organisational duty, and iii) specific 
operational duties. Whilst the focus of this thesis will be on the operational duty, to 
fully understand this it is important to understand how these duties relate to each 
other. 
 
Over recent years decisions by both the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and the United Kingdom’s (UK) courts have shaped the scope of the operational duty 
imposed on to states by Article 2. As the ECHR is incorporated into UK law by the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) these decisions are particularly important as 
claims can be brought directly against public authorities under the HRA 1998, as well 
as against the state as a whole before the ECtHR. Consequently, both domestic and 
ECHR law will be considered in this thesis. Despite these developments there is still a 
lack of clarity surrounding certain aspects of the positive duty to protect life, 
especially after the Supreme Court’s decision in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust.2 
Rabone involved a claim by the parents of Melanie Rabone, a voluntary psychiatric 
patient admitted to hospital to receive treatment for depression, who committed 
                                                
1 Article 2(1) ECHR. 
2 [2012] UKSC 2. 
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suicide while on home leave. Her parents sued the hospital in negligence and for 
breach of Article 2. The Supreme Court reached the significant decision that the 
operational duty did apply to voluntary patients, as well as detained patients, and that 
it had been breached by the hospital. This expansion of the duty beyond the 
circumstances in which it was originally designed to apply, has raised a number of 
questions, for example whether the duty should apply to all public authorities and 
how the emphasis on vulnerability will affect the nature and the scope of the duty. 
Although the main focus will be on health authorities, it is necessary to consider the 
law relating to other public authorities as well in order to determine the scope of the 
operational duty and how it applies. It will be argued that the operational duty should 
not apply to all public authorities; instead whether a public authority is subject to the 
duty should depend on the function that it carries out. Adopting this approach will 
allow the duty to vary depending on the public authority involved and will mean that 
the concepts that trigger the duty, such as notions of control and vulnerability, can be 
defined properly. This will allow the duty to be controlled and will prevent it from 
applying too broadly, as critics of Rabone have feared.3 It will be argued that to 
establish that the operational duty applies will be a two stage test: firstly, it will need 
to be established that the relationship between the public authority and the victim 
gives rise to the operational duty, and secondly, the test from Osman v United 
Kingdom4 must be satisfied and it should be shown that there was a real and 
immediate risk to life that the authorities knew or ought to have known about. To 
establish breach of the duty it must be further proven that they failed to take 
reasonable steps to prevent this risk.  
 
                                                
3 Andrew Tettenborn, ‘Wrongful Death, Human Rights, and the Fatal Accidents Act’ (2012) 128 LQR 
327, 329. 
4 [2000] 29 EHRR 245. 
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Following Rabone, when applying the duty to health authorities the relevant factors in 
triggering the duty will be vulnerability coupled with a dependence upon the health 
authority for protection. At present the courts have acknowledged that vulnerability is 
important in healthcare cases, but no definition has been given, meaning that it is 
unclear when a duty based on vulnerability will be triggered. The existing 
jurisprudence on vulnerability comes from cases involving control and detention of 
individuals5 and so this type of vulnerability will be different to that in healthcare 
cases following Rabone, as now the duty can apply to voluntary, as well as detained, 
patients. This thesis will propose a definition of vulnerability that can be applied 
specifically to healthcare cases. In doing so it will be shown that even if vulnerability 
is present this will not necessarily mean that the duty is engaged as the factors set out 
in the Osman test will have to be established. 
 
Following this, the thesis will briefly consider the liability in negligence of public 
authorities for breaches of a positive duty of care. Although the official judicial 
position is that actions in negligence and those brought under the HRA 1998 are 
separate,6 in practice the law is far more complex than this as there are a number of 
similarities between the two actions. It will be demonstrated that these similarities 
mean that the two should be more consistent at the duty stage, but as there are also 
important differences they should remain separate where breach and remedies are 
concerned. 
 
Although the primary focus of the thesis will be on the operational duty imposed by 
Article 2, it is necessary to first discuss the investigatory duty. The existing European 
                                                
5 For example in Keenan v United Kingdom [2001] 33 EHRR 38. 
6 Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex [2008] UKHL 50. 
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and domestic jurisprudence on the investigatory duty is unclear and so the 
relationship between the two duties will be discussed in order to determine the scope, 
and aims, of each duty. The ECHR jurisprudence provides broad guiding principles 
on the scope of the investigatory duty and applies it to the state as a whole, 
consequently there is uncertainty over how this should implemented in UK law. As 
the focus is on health authorities, it will mainly consider the impact of the 
investigatory duty in cases involving health authorities. 
   5 
CHAPTER ONE: THE INVESTIGATORY DUTY 
 
 
To gain a full understanding of the operational duty, it is important to consider its 
relationship with the Article 2 investigatory duty and so a comprehensive 
understanding of the investigatory duty is needed before the operational duty will be 
considered. The investigatory duty imposed by Article 2 of the ECHR was first 
expressly developed in McCann and Others v United Kingdom,1 where the ECtHR 
held that there was a duty to investigate ‘where individuals have been killed as a 
result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State.’2 This duty has since been 
developed by the ECtHR to apply in a wider number of circumstances, but has largely 
been neglected in recent years and has attracted little attention from scholars. This 
chapter will compare ECHR law and domestic law and in doing so will demonstrate 
that there is a lack of clarity with regards to three aspects of the duty: (i) the remit of 
the duty, (ii) its relationship with the Article 2 substantive duty, which relates to the 
general organisational and specific operational duties; and (iii) the form of the 
investigation required to fulfil the duty. 
 
It is the lack of clarity on this third point that is most problematic in UK law. In the 
UK the primary method of satisfying the duty is by way of an inquest, but other 
methods are sometimes used, for example an internal inquiry, a full public inquiry or 
disciplinary proceedings. Recently it has become more apparent that a clear set of 
guiding principles is needed about what type of investigation is required or is 
appropriate in a given set of circumstances. The recent report by an independent panel 
                                                
1 [1996] 21 EHRR 97. 
2 ibid [161]. 
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on the Hillsborough disaster has demonstrated this need for clearer guidelines. The 
report identified in particular that more information is needed on what is required 
from, and during, investigations as it found that there were problems with disclosure 
of materials to the public despite ‘various different modes [of investigation] and 
levels of scrutiny’3 being carried out over a number of years. This has been 
highlighted by recent calls for reform of the coroners system, which began with 
provisions in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.4 The Chief Coroner, Judge Peter 
Thornton QC, has also identified a number of issues that he wishes to reform,5 
including Rule 43 Reports.6 This lack of clarity is further exacerbated by the 
uncertainty over the purpose of investigations, as acknowledged by the Chief 
Coroner.7  
 
As a result, before it can be identified how the investigative duty will apply in cases 
involving health authorities these three issues must be considered and the questions 
answered. This chapter will argue that the purpose of the Article 2 duty is twofold: 
firstly the investigation should publicly identify any wrongdoing on the part of a state 
agent and should hold them to account; and secondly the investigation should have a 
role in identifying mistakes and preventing future deaths in similar circumstances. It 
                                                
3 Hillsborough Independent Panel, ‘Hillsborough: The Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel’ 
(2012, HC 581) 3 
<http://hillsborough.independent.gov.uk/repository/report/HIP_report.pdf> accessed 10 December 
2012. 
4 These provisions have not yet been fully implemented, but are expected to come into force in June 
2013 as noted by Peter Thornton, ‘The Coroner System in the 21st Century’ (Howard League for Penal 
Reform Parmoor Lecture, 25 October 2012) [24] 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/coroner-system-21st-century-
chief-coroner-speech-howard-league.pdf> accessed 16 November 2012. 
5 Peter Thornton, Chief Coroner’s Speech at the Annual Conference of the Coroner’s Society of 
England and Wales (September 2012) 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/chief-coroner-speech-coroners-
society-conference.pdf> accessed 16 November 2012. 
6 Which enable coroners to produce reports making recommendations on how future deaths can be 
prevented. 
7 Thornton, ‘The Coroner System…’ (n 4) [39]. 
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will also argue that in terms of its discharge, the form of the duty should be tailored to 
the circumstances and in particular to the specific nature of the public body involved. 
It will argue that in the context of health authorities, the most appropriate solution is 
the creation of independent inquiry panels within individual health authorities. 
 
Section 1: ECHR Law on the Article 2 Investigatory Duty. 
 
(i) Remit of the Duty 
 
As highlighted, the investigatory duty was first expressly developed by the ECtHR in 
McCann. The Court considered that ‘a general prohibition of arbitrary killing by 
agents of the State would be ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure for 
reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by State authorities.’8 Thus the 
purpose of the investigatory duty is to ensure that those responsible for unlawful 
deaths are held accountable. The duty to investigate has since been expanded beyond 
cases involving the use of direct force by a state agent and has been recognised in 
cases where the victim was under the responsibility of the state,9 in cases where there 
was only indirect involvement of state agents,10 in situations where the State has been 
carrying out a dangerous activity11 and even where serious injuries have been inflicted 
but have not resulted in death.12 The ECtHR appear to have adopted a flexible and 
expansive approach to the investigatory duty, which is further highlighted by their 
willingness to find that the duty to investigate death, or serious injury, applies 
                                                
8 McCann (n 1) [161]. 
9 Powell v United Kingdom [2000] 30 EHRR CD 362, Edwards v United Kingdom [2002] 35 EHRR 
19. 
10 Menson v United Kingdom [2003] 37 EHRR CD 220. 
11 Öneryildiz v Turkey [2005] EHRR 20. 
12 Menson (n 10). 
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whenever Article 2 is engaged, even where a breach is only suspected.  This approach 
has the benefit of enabling the ECtHR to respond to differing factual circumstances 
and to provide a wider applicability for the investigatory duty. Consequently, it helps 
to fulfil the purpose of the investigatory duty given in McCann as it allows the court 
to consider a wide number of scenarios and to expand the duty where necessary in 
order to review the actions taken by state agents. 
 
(ii) Relationship with the Substantive Duty 
 
This expansive approach suggests that the duty to investigate can occur even where 
there has not been a breach of the substantive obligation.13 The ECtHR has previously 
considered the investigatory duty separately to the substantive duty, for example in 
McKerr v United Kingdom14 and Brecknell v United Kingdom.15 However, the issue 
was not specifically dealt with by the ECtHR until recently. Even though the case 
centred on whether the duty could apply where the death predated entry into the 
ECHR, the issue of whether the substantive and investigatory duties are separate was 
expressly considered in Šilih v Slovenia.16  Here, the duty was described as having 
‘evolved into a separate and autonomous duty’17 and it was acknowledged that even 
though the duty is triggered by actions relating to the substantive duty, it is now a 
‘detachable duty’,18 suggesting that it can be considered in its own right. If the duty to 
investigate were found to be independent of the substantive duty then it would allow 
for a very flexible approach and would ensure that an effective investigation is carried 
                                                
13 DJ Harris and others, Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (2nd Edn, OUP, 2009) 66-67. 
14 [2002] 34 EHRR 20. 
15 [2008] 46 EHRR 42. 
16 [2009] 49 EHRR 37. 
17 ibid [159]. 
18 ibid [159]. 
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out in all cases where one is required, rather than simply in cases where the 
substantive Article 2 duty has been breached. This would therefore help to achieve the 
aim of using the investigatory duty to ensure that the Article 2 provisions are 
‘practical and effective’19 and to meet the aims of the duty as established in McCann. 
 
(iii) Form of the Duty 
 
The ECtHR has not specified the form that an Article 2 investigation must take; 
instead they have acknowledged that the type of investigation that will meet the aims 
‘may vary in different circumstances’,20 which allows for flexibility within member 
states. The Court has emphasised that the duty is on the authorities to begin the 
investigation as soon as they are aware of the incident; it cannot be left to the victim’s 
next-of-kin.21 They have, however, set a minimum standard that the investigation 
must meet in order to be effective.22 The investigation must be independent, meaning 
that there must be both ‘a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a 
practical independence.’23 It must also be able to lead to ‘a determination of whether 
the force used in such cases was justified in the circumstances and to the 
identification and punishment of those responsible.’24 However, the emphasis is on 
the ability of the investigation to secure evidence and testimonies, rather than on the 
result. The investigation must be prompt, both in its beginning and in its undertaking. 
It must also be subject to public scrutiny, however, ‘[t]he degree of public scrutiny 
required may well vary from case to case’ but nevertheless the next-of-kin of the 
                                                
19 ibid [153]. 
20 Jordan v United Kingdom [2003] 37 EHRR 2 [105]. 
21 ibid [105]. 
22 ibid [105]-[109]. 
23 ibid [106]. 
24 ibid [107]. 
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victim should always be involved to the extent that their legitimate interests are 
protected.25  
 
As a result, although there are minimum requirements for an effective investigation, 
what is actually required remains vague due to the lack of clear guidance from the 
ECtHR. This approach is very flexible as it allows for the fact that the type of 
investigation needed will depend on the circumstances of the case.26 As the duty to 
investigate covers a wide range of scenarios, that continue to be expanded,27 and 
involves a number of variables it would be hard to define exactly what is required 
from an investigation and so this flexibility is important. However, it can be 
problematic. The ECtHR have simply stated that an investigation needs to be carried 
out, but have not clarified what kind of investigation is required. In Pearson v United 
Kingdom28 the ECtHR ruled that ‘the essential principle [behind an article 2 
investigation] is that the key facts should be brought out for public scrutiny and that 
the procedures provide for effective accountability.’29 This appears to provide a basis 
for the duty to investigate and could potentially provide more guidance for national 
courts as it states what the investigative duty aims to achieve. However, this is still a 
vague statement as it must remain flexible enough to cover a wide number of 
circumstances, as acknowledged: ‘[i]t cannot be said… that there should be one 
unified procedure satisfying all requirements: the aims of fact-finding and 
accountability may be carried out by or shared between several authorities, as long as 
the various procedures provide for the necessary safeguards in an accessible and 
                                                
25 ibid [109]. 
26 ibid [105]. 
27 R (on the application of JL) v Secretary of State for Justice [2008] UKHL 68 [31] (Lord Phillips). 
28 [2012] 54 EHRR SE11. 
29 ibid [71]. 
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effective manner.’30 The closest guidance on what form of investigation is required 
comes from Öneryildiz v Turkey,31 where it was held that the duty to investigate can 
be satisfied by criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary procedures and that what 
is required from an investigation depends on what the substantive obligation requires 
as a remedy.32 
 
The duty to investigate has growing relevance and is being extended to apply in an 
increasing number of circumstances in order to fulfil the aims formulated in McCann. 
It even appears that following Šilih the duty has been transformed into one that is 
independent of the substantive duty. As already acknowledged, where a claim under 
Article 2 is made before the ECtHR the defendant is the member state accused of 
breaching the duty by failing to provide an effective investigation. This has 
implications on the way that the duty has been developed as it means that the duty has 
been formulated in a very general way, due to each state’s margin of appreciation as it 
is left to each state to determine how to comply with the duty.33 Consequently, the 
ECHR law on the duty remains rather vague. 
 
Section 2: Current UK Law. 
 
The general duty to investigate developed by ECHR law is problematic when national 
courts apply it, as the defendant in these cases is not the state as a whole, but an organ 
of the state, i.e. a public authority. Consequently, the duty to investigate becomes 
                                                
30 ibid [71]. 
31 Öneryildiz (n 11). 
32 ibid [92]-[93]. 
33 Juliet Chevalier-Watts, ‘Effective Investigations Under Article 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Securing the Right to Life or an Onerous Burden on a State?’ (2010) 21 EJIL 701, 704-
705. 
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subject to interpretation by the national courts and so how the duty is carried out will 
vary depending on the public authority involved. As a result, the ECtHR 
jurisprudence has limited use when being applied to individual public authorities, as it 
is far too general in its scope. It is thus necessary to consider the duty as applied by 
the UK courts in order to clarify what the duty to investigate involves when applied to 
public authorities. By looking at the UK jurisprudence it can be determined how the 
duty is applied to public authorities as organs of the state and whether it is applied as 
a general duty or whether it is tailored to suit each public authority. Once this has 
been considered it should be possible to determine how the duty currently applies 
specifically to health authorities. 
 
(i) Remit of the Duty 
 
Whilst the ECtHR adopt a very flexible approach to the Article 2 duty to investigate, 
the approach taken by the UK courts appears to be more rigid and a lot depends upon 
the facts of the case. It has been argued that in the UK the courts attempt to fit the 
European jurisprudence into a model that they have created where scenarios are 
classified into three categories.34 These categories are: i) where death or serious injury 
resulted from direct unlawful force from a state agent, ii) where death or serious 
injury occurs whilst in custody and iii) where death or serious injury occurs in 
hospital.35 These distinctions were demonstrated by the decision in R (on the 
application of Takoushis) v HM Coroner for Inner North London36 where it was held 
that different principles applied to cases where a death occurred in hospital to where a 
                                                
34 Aidan O’Neill, ‘Some Reflections on Article 2 and the Procedural Obligations to Investigate Deaths’ 
(UKSC Blog, 30/06/2010) <http://ukscblog.com/some-reflections-on-article-2-and-the-procedural-
obligations-to-investigate-deaths> accessed 1 November 2012. 
35 ibid.  
36 [2005] EWCA Civ 1440. 
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death occurred in police custody.37 If a death occurs whilst in police custody then an 
investigation under Article 2 is automatically required if the state has failed in its duty 
of care towards the individual, whereas if a death occurs whilst the victim is in 
hospital then an Article 2 investigation is not required unless there has been gross 
negligence or a systematic fault. Instead, all that must be satisfied is the positive 
obligation to have a system in place to provide an investigation if necessary, this can 
be a civil, criminal or disciplinary investigation depending upon the circumstances. 
Whether this distinction can be maintained after the Supreme Court decision in 
Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust38 is questionable. The Court in Takoushis placed 
emphasis on the fact that the victim was not detained by the state39 and so no duty 
applied. However, in Rabone it was said that this distinction between detainees and 
voluntary patients is irrelevant when considering whether the Article 2 substantive 
obligations apply and so it is possible that the same may apply to the investigatory 
duty. The approach taken by the UK courts appears to be less flexible than that taken 
by the ECtHR, which can be problematic. For example, in Öneryildiz the ECtHR 
were able to find a breach of the investigatory duty as they extended the substantive 
obligation to cover dangerous activities being conducted by state agents. If a similar 
case had arisen in the UK first then it is arguable that the courts would have faced 
more difficulty in determining it, as it would not easily fit into the three categories.40 
As a result the law relating to the investigatory duty is unclear as it is unknown how 
the duty would apply in different circumstances, as these scenarios cannot cover every 
situation that could arise. In addition, this results in varying standards for engaging 
                                                
37 ibid [105]. 
38 [2012] UKSC 2. 
39 Jeremy Hyam, ‘Where Inquests Raise a Question of Human Rights’ (UK Human Rights Blog, March 
2010) 12 
<http://www.1cor.com/1155/records/1245/Where_Inquests_Raise_A_Question_of_Human_Rights180
109.pdf> accessed 5 November 2012. 
40 Although this is not to say that a duty would not have been found. 
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the duty depending on the public authority concerned, which potentially creates 
inconsistent results and is less flexible as it means that where a death has occurred 
that could be attributable to the state an investigation is not always required.  
 
At present there is no express reasoning to explain why the duty differs depending on 
the public authority involved. Consequently, there is no recognition that the duty 
should be different depending on the authority involved, because each carries out 
specific functions that differ. It is proposed that the duty should be tailored to the 
public authority in question to allow for these differing functions. A similar approach 
was acknowledged by the House of Lords in Re Officer L,41 although this case 
concerned the operational duty under Article 2, it was held that the standard of the 
duty was ‘based on reasonableness’42 and so what each authority is expected to do 
depends on the circumstances and so will differ. This could be applied to the 
investigatory duty as well. It is submitted that the UK courts should adopt a similar 
approach to that taken by the ECtHR, where each case is judged on an individual 
basis and it is asked whether or not Article 2 applies and whether or not ‘the death 
occur[ed] in a situation which raises issues of public concern’.43 This would 
determine whether or not the duty to investigate applies. If it does then the duty could 
be formulated so that it is specific to the facts of the case. This could then allow for 
different results being required and different methods of investigation depending on 
the facts of the case and the involvement of the public authority. This would allow for 
more flexibility than the current approach, but would also mean that the threshold for 
engaging the Article 2 duty is not the same for all public authorities. In addition, by 
                                                
41 [2007] UKHL 36. 
42 ibid [21] (Lord Carswell). 
43 O’Neill (n 34). 
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formulating the duty in relation to the public authority, each will know what is 
expected of them to fulfil the duty, removing some of the existing uncertainty. 
 
As the duty to investigate has been left vague by the ECtHR there also appears to be 
doubt over what is actually covered by the duty and what must be involved in the 
investigation. As highlighted by Mr Aidan Cotter, HM Coroner for the City of 
Birmingham and the Borough of Solihull, inquests are often subject to large delays, 
with the inquest sometimes occurring years after the death of the victim.44 It can be 
argued that part of the reason for such delays in inquests could result from the lack of 
clarity over the meaning of the duty to investigate. For example, a lot of time is spent 
debating the scope of the duty and what is relevant to the inquest in question.45 The 
investigatory duty has been interpreted as requiring ‘the state to ensure, by all means 
at its disposal, an adequate investigative response, judicial or otherwise.’46 This raises 
the question of what exactly the scope of the duty is and what the coroner has to 
consider when conducting his inquest. It also demonstrates that more guidance is 
needed over what must be considered in order to satisfy the duty. This raises 
questions about the investigatory procedure as a whole and about the role of other 
procedures available for satisfying the duty and how they relate to the inquest. It 
highlights that in order for the dual aim of the duty to be properly satisfied what is 
needed is a way of ensuring that systematic failures are rectified and learnt from, 
whilst still ensuring that the inquest relates to the death of the individual and simply 
highlights the problems that exist within the system. This suggests that in practice 
                                                
44 Interview with Mr Aidan Cotter, HM Coroner for the City of Birmingham and the Borough of 
Solihull (Sutton Coldfield Town Hall, 30th November 2012). 
45 ibid. 
46 Pearson (n 28). 
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perhaps what is needed is a system of investigation that provides better incorporation 
of these other mechanisms for investigation. 
 
(ii) Relationship with the Substantive Duty 
 
Whilst the ECtHR jurisprudence has demonstrated a willingness to find the duty to 
investigate in cases where the substantive obligation under Article 2 has not been 
breached, the approach taken by the UK courts is less clear. This raises the question 
of whether, under domestic law, the duty to investigate can apply independently from 
the substantive duty under Article 2. Following R (on the application of Middleton) v 
HM Coroner for Western Somerset47and R (on the application of Gentle) v Prime 
Minister48 there appeared to be an established position within the UK that the 
investigative duty was ‘parasitic upon the existence of the substantive right’ and its 
existence depended on the substantive right.49 However, this was called into question 
by the decision of the House of Lords in R (on the application of JL) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department50 which held that the duty did not just apply in cases 
where there was an arguable breach of the substantive duty, instead the duty can apply 
in order to determine if preventive action is necessary.51 O’Neill has argued that this 
is less clear following R (on the application of Smith) v HM Oxfordshire Assistant 
Deputy Coroner52 and that as a result it is questionable whether the current approach 
is consistent with that taken by the ECtHR.53 Although the issue in R (on the 
application of Smith) concerned the scope of the ECHR and whether it applied to 
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British troops serving in Iraq, their Lordships briefly explored the issue of whether the 
duty to investigate is separate to the substantive duty. They did not, however, reach a 
consensus on this. Lord Phillips argued that the investigatory duty would be ‘limited’ 
if it only applied ‘if, and only if, there are grounds for suspecting a breach by the State 
of a substantive article 2 obligation’.54 This appears to suggest that the possibility of a 
breach is enough to engage the duty.55 However, Lord Hope argued that ‘[t]he 
procedural obligation depends on the existence of the substantive right. It cannot exist 
independently’.56 This approach is consistent with that taken in Middleton and Gentle 
and requires more than the possibility of a breach before the duty is engaged. Instead 
it requires a suspected, or actual, breach, implying that a higher threshold must be 
passed before the duty is engaged. Whilst the comments in R (on the application of 
Smith) were obiter, they indicate that there is confusion over how the duty to 
investigate operates in relation to the substantive duty and that it is unclear whether or 
not the duty can apply independently of the substantive duty. As already stated, the 
aims of the duty to investigate would be better fulfilled if the duty were separate from 
the substantive duty as it would ensure effective investigation in a wider number of 
cases. 
 
(iii) Form of the Duty 
 
When fulfilling the investigatory duty there are a number of forms that investigations 
can take, for example the duty can be discharged by way of an inquest. In the UK the 
traditional inquest is known as a Jamieson inquest, following the case of R v HM 
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Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe Ex Parte Jamieson.57 A Jamieson 
inquest establishes who the deceased was as well as how, when and where they died. 
In this type of inquest ‘‘how’ is to be understood as meaning ‘by what means’’ and 
‘the task is not to ascertain how the deceased died, which might raise general and far-
reaching issues, but ‘how… the deceased came by his death’’.58 However, in 
Middleton it was held that a Jamieson inquest does not always satisfy the 
investigatory duty under Article 2.59 As a result the House of Lords reinterpreted the 
relevant sections of the Coroners Act 1988 relating to the determination of how the 
victim died using section 3 of the HRA 1998. They adopted a wider meaning of the 
term ‘how’ in section 11(5)(b)(ii) of the Coroners Act 1988 so that it now means 
discovering ‘by what means and in what circumstance’ the victim died.60 Following 
this decision there are now two types of inquests that can be held in the UK. The 
question has since arisen as to when a Middleton inquest is required: is it always 
required where a death has occurred or is it only required when there has been a 
suspected breach of Article 2? It has also raised the question of what the difference is 
between a Middleton and Jamieson inquest. In their recent report, Inquest noted that 
there is confusion surrounding Middleton inquests and that whilst they can be very 
beneficial these positive implications are being limited.61 The report highlighted three 
main problems in the current system: firstly, that there is confusion about when to use 
Middleton inquests, secondly that there is confusion about how to use the Middleton 
inquests, and thirdly, that Middleton inquests are not currently being ‘properly utilised 
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as a valuable resource for analysis and learning.’62 This demonstrates that confusion 
exists within coronial practice and, as inquests are the normal method of satisfying the 
investigation duty,63 also suggests that there is little consistency in how the duty is 
being fulfilled nationally. It has been argued that Article 2 is relevant to both 
Jamieson and Middleton inquests.64 Hyam argues that all inquests raise Article 2 
issues as ‘the state still has an obligation under Article 2(1) to provide an independent 
judicial system to establish the cause of death and any liability.’65 This implies that 
the question of Article 2 and whether the duty to hold an effective investigation 
applies is less straightforward than some have suggested and that there is a lack of 
clarity over when the duty to investigate is engaged and how it can be satisfied. It 
seems that in some cases it is covered by the substantive requirement to have an 
effective system in place, for example in cases of medical negligence,66 yet in other 
cases the separate investigative duty is engaged and a full, effective investigation is 
required. 
 
Recently, there has also been some question over the difference between Middleton 
and Jamieson inquests. In Smith v HM Oxfordshire Assistant Deputy Coroner, Lord 
Phillips cast doubt on the difference between the two types of inquest, stating that the 
only real difference is ‘the form of the verdict.’67 Lord Hope, however, maintained 
that there is a definite difference between the two inquests and that a Middleton 
inquest should only be used where the Article 2 investigatory duty is engaged.68 This 
highlights that there is a lack of clarity within the judiciary about what kind of inquest 
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is required. However, following Lord Phillips’ comments in R (on the application of 
Smith) it appears that on a practical level there is little difference between Middleton 
and Jamieson inquests, other than the type of verdict available and that in some cases 
the same witnesses would be called and the same questions asked in both a Middleton 
and a Jamieson inquest.69 This implies that there may be differing standards being 
applied nationally as it remains unclear when a Middleton or Jamieson inquest is 
required. Again, this highlights that more guidance is needed as to how to fulfil the 
investigatory duty. 
 
Lord Bingham stated in Middleton that the ECtHR ‘has never expressly ruled what 
the final product of an official investigation, to satisfy the procedural obligation 
imposed by article 2 of the Convention, should be.’70 He ruled that a traditional 
factual inquiry may be enough to satisfy the requirements in some cases, whereas in 
others a wider investigation is needed and the coroner can choose the type of verdict 
required depending on the circumstances. Consequently, it is open to the coroner to 
choose between a narrative verdict, a shorter verdict or he can ask the jury to answer 
certain questions depending on what is required in order to satisfy the duty.71 This 
demonstrates that there are gaps within the law as whilst the coroner is best placed to 
decide what kind of verdict is required and to direct the jury, the findings in the recent 
Inquest report72 suggest that more guidance is needed over when to use each verdict. 
Similarly, although coroners’ inquests are the normal method of satisfying the 
investigatory duty, there has been no official guidance on the purpose of these 
inquests and what they aim to achieve, although the Chief Coroner has recently 
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spoken of what he believes the purpose to be.73 He concluded that the modern coroner 
has two purposes: the first is to publicly investigate the death and determine the cause 
in order to expose any potential wrongdoing by an agent of the state, and secondly to 
prevent future deaths from occurring in a similar manner.74 This is further 
complicated by the lack of guidance from the ECtHR on what the purpose of the 
investigatory duty actually is. In R (on the application of Amin (Imtiaz)) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department75 Lord Bingham gave his interpretation of what the 
purpose of the duty is: ‘to ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to 
light; that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; 
that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous 
practices and procedures are rectified; and that those who have lost their relative may 
at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his death may save 
the lives of others.’76 This definition appears to go beyond the decision in McCann as 
it widens the purpose from just accountability of state agents, to include prevention of 
future deaths. It does, however, resemble the dual purpose identified by the Chief 
Coroner.77 This highlights the problem that without a clear purpose behind these 
investigations it is hard to define what form they should take. For example, if the 
purpose is prevention as well as accountability then there needs to be more of an 
emphasis on procedures that allow recommendations to be made by the person 
conducting the investigation, for example the coroner, and for these recommendations 
to be acted upon. Inquest reported that there is no such method for acting on 
recommendations made by coroners in Rule 43 reports and that ‘the lack of effective 
mechanism for monitoring the action taken in response to rule 43 reports is crucial, 
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particularly where they have commented on serious and systematic problems within 
an institution, and action that needs to be taken to prevent other deaths occurring.’78 
In order to properly fulfil the identified aims of the investigatory duty, it is crucial that 
a method for learning from deaths in order to prevent future deaths in similar 
circumstances, and acting on recommendations, is put into place. 
 
Consequently, it is argued that the duty would be carried out more effectively if there 
were a specifically appointed body within the public authority responsible for 
investigations and acting on recommendations made by coroners in Rule 43 reports. 
Such a body would need to have the power to call in independent investigators not 
involved in the event where necessary in order to satisfy the requirement that Article 
2 investigations must be independent. In Jordan, it was acknowledged that as the 
police investigation was carried out by officers hierarchically linked to the officer 
involved in the events this raised issues regarding the independence of the 
investigation.79 The responsibility of initiating the investigation could then fall to this 
body and they could interact with the coroner and report the death to him. This 
method could also potentially include the reform proposed by the Chief Coroner of 
creating specialised coroners who deal with specific types of deaths, for example 
those that occur in custody.80 The body could also be responsible for receiving the 
recommendations that result from investigations and any Rule 43 reports made by the 
coroner. As the body would be part of the public authority they would be best placed 
to receive these recommendations as they would have the necessary expertise to know 
whether the idea is feasible and whether the actions can indeed be taken, or how to 
implement any recommendations. They could also be responsible for publishing these 
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Rule 43 reports, any recommendations made and actions taken so that reforms can be 
acted on nationally, rather than just locally. It has recently been noted by the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission that one current problem with these 
recommendations is that where they are implemented they are not always 
implemented nationally or communicated properly.81 
 
Article 2 places a duty on the state to hold an effective investigation, and the ECtHR 
has made it clear that it is up to the state to initiate the investigation.82 This raises the 
question of who is responsible for initiating the investigation within the state. There is 
little guidance from the ECtHR on who should conduct the investigation, other than 
that the investigators must be independent.83 The Government appears to have 
adopted the position that a coroner’s inquest is the normal way of satisfying the 
investigatory duty and that this can be supplemented by independent investigations 
conducted by other bodies, as well as civil, criminal and disciplinary proceedings, if 
necessary.84 The result is that the investigations, and who conducts the investigations, 
differ depending on the public authority involved and in some cases means that a 
number of different bodies within public authorities are conducting investigations. For 
example, when a death occurs in custody there are a number of investigations that can 
satisfy the Article 2 duty, including an inquest, an investigation by the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission and an investigation by the Prisons and Probation 
Ombudsman.85 The circumstances when each can investigate differ slightly, for 
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example a coroner’s inquest is required whenever a person dies in custody, but the 
Prisons and Probation Ombudsman will only investigate ‘deaths of prisoners, 
residents of probation service-approved premises, and immigration detainees’,86 
whilst the Independent Police Complaints Commission will investigate where a death 
has resulted from police conduct. The same is true to an extent where health 
authorities are concerned. It has been highlighted that ‘[t]here is no single person or 
agency responsible for investigating the deaths of patients in mental health settings’87 
and that these deaths can be investigated through a number of methods, including ‘an 
inquest, an internal hospital inquiry… a commissioned independent body, or a 
combination of some or all of them.’88 This demonstrates that even within public 
authorities there is no set protocol for satisfying the investigatory duty and raises the 
question of whether the duty is actually being satisfied in these circumstances.89  It is 
also unclear who has the responsibility for investigating and who must initiate the 
investigation, suggesting that a simpler and clearer system within each public 
authority is required. 
 
In Amin it was acknowledged that a number of methods of investigation can be used 
in order to satisfy the Article 2 duty, with Lord Bingham placing particular emphasis 
on the role of the inquest in doing this: ‘it is very unfortunate that there was no 
inquest, since a properly conducted inquest can discharge the state’s investigative 
obligation’.90 However, whilst other methods of investigation can be used there is 
little guidance from the ECtHR on what kind of investigation is required in a given 
case. Lord Slynn acknowledged that a combination of investigations can be used but 
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when added together they must meet the minimum requirements specified by the 
ECtHR.91 In the UK public inquiries are governed by the Inquiries Act 2005, which 
provides that a Minister can hold a public inquiry where ‘particular events have 
caused, or are capable of causing, public concern, or there is public concern that 
particular events have occurred.’92 However, beyond this there is little guidance on 
when a public inquiry should be held as Ministers have a lot of discretion under the 
2005 Act and much depends on what amounts to an issue of ‘public concern’. 
Amnesty International have specified a set of criteria that can be used to determine if 
a public inquiry is required: i) where there have been ‘[a]llegations of serious 
misconduct… against those acting, or purporting to act on behalf of the state’, ii) 
where ‘[t]hose allegations are sufficiently widespread and are being treated 
sufficiently seriously by those outside Government to undermine the public’s 
confidence in the integrity of the State and in the rule of law’, iii) where these 
‘allegations related to a sufficiently defined event or series of events to allow an 
inquiry to be given proper and clear terms of reference’, and, iv) ‘[a]n inquiry would 
represent the most effective means of establishing the merit of the allegations made 
and so of restoring the public confidence.’93 Yet even these are hard to define and it is 
submitted that more official guidance is needed, as sometimes a public inquiry will be 
the most appropriate method of satisfying the Article 2 duty. For example where the 
issue is so serious that it demands a higher level of public scrutiny than can be 
provided by another investigation, or where the level of independence required cannot 
be achieved by a coroner, for example if a death in custody is being investigated then 
a coroner may not be best placed to fulfil the investigation as they often rely on police 
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investigations when conducting their inquests.94 This lack of guidance, and the 
dissatisfaction with this, is demonstrated by the ongoing legal battle surrounding 
whether a public inquiry should be held to investigate the shooting of Patrick 
Finucane in 1989.95 Despite the Government promising to hold a public inquiry in 
2004, David Cameron, in 2011, reneged on this promise and instead proposed an 
independent review, which has recently published its findings.96 The lack of guidance 
on public inquiries means that they are discretionary in nature and so there is 
uncertainty surrounding when a public inquiry will be held and allows ministers to 
more easily default on promises to hold inquiries. 
 
When applied by the UK courts the duty is more specific than when applied by the 
ECtHR as rather than being applied to the state as a whole, it is being applied more 
narrowly to specific public authorities, as organs of the state. However, the law is 
unacceptably vague and it is not entirely clear how the duty must be carried out by 
these authorities, or what results are required. There are also gaps in the law 
concerning inquests and what kind of inquest is required. The UK’s approach also 
raises the question of whether or not the investigative duty can arise independently of 
the substantive approach, which in turn raises the issue of whether the UK is 
complying fully with the decisions of the ECtHR.97 
 
Section 3: The Application of the Article 2 Investigatory Duty in Healthcare Contexts. 
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It has been proposed that the duty to investigate should be adapted to each public 
authority to suit the kind of scenarios that each deals with as this will produce the best 
results for meeting the aims of the duty. As this thesis is concentrating on the liability 
of health authorities it will now consider how this would apply specifically to health 
authorities. It will examine two possible scenarios: i) where a doctor/nurse is directly 
involved in the death of a patient, for example by administering too much pain 
medication, and ii) where the health authority fails to protect a patient and they 
commit suicide.  
 
In the first scenario, the Article 2 investigatory duty would be engaged as Powell v 
United Kingdom98 extended the duty beyond scenarios involving violence and held 
that there needs to be ‘an effective independent system for establishing the cause of 
death of an individual under the care and responsibility of health professionals.’99 It 
would therefore be up to the investigatory body within the health authority to report 
the death to the coroner and to initiate the investigation. They could decide whether to 
establish and conduct an internal hospital inquiry or whether the inquest alone would 
be enough to comply with the investigative duty. This body could then decide 
whether to act on any recommendations made by the coroner through Rule 43 reports, 
or whether to act on findings made by any other investigations that are carried out. It 
would also be up to the investigatory body to decide whether it is appropriate to refer 
the case to the Crown Prosecution Service. In this scenario it is likely that an inquiry 
into the hospital practice would be necessary as the death could potentially mean that 
there are wider systematic failures, such as problems in communication between 
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nurses and doctors as to what medication has been administered, that need to be 
investigated. 
 
The second scenario would also trigger the investigatory duty as although the death 
was not directly caused by the health authority, the duty from Powell would still apply 
as the patient would have been under the responsibility of the health authority, even if 
they were not detained.100 Again, it would be up to the investigatory body to report 
the death to the coroner so that an inquest could be conducted. They could also decide 
whether or not a hospital inquiry is needed and could act on any recommendations 
made by any inquiries conducted or Rule 43 reports made by the Coroner. In this 
scenario it is likely that an inquiry into the practice would be needed in order to 
determine what precise failures led to the death of the patient. It would again be up to 
the independent body to determine if further action needs to be taken as a result of 
this. In addition to triggering the investigatory duty, this scenario may also trigger the 
operational duty under Article 2, meaning that the health authority may have had a 
duty to take certain operational measures to prevent the death. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, when formulating the investigatory duty, the ECtHR has adopted a flexible 
and expansive approach, as demonstrated by the growing number of circumstances in 
which they have found the duty. This has resulted in a general duty that applies to 
states with little specific guidance as to how the duty should be implemented by the 
state. The duty to investigate is consequently rather vague and certain issues remain 
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unclear, for example what kind of investigation must be conducted. The jurisprudence 
from the UK is more specific as it applies specifically to the public authorities 
involved and so provides more clarity on how the duty works within the UK. 
However, it is still not entirely clear and there are gaps that remain in the law. For 
example, with regards to the type of investigation that is required, what results are 
required and whether or not the investigative duty can arise independently of the 
substantive duty. There are also differing thresholds for when the duty is engaged 
depending on the scenario and the public authority involved. This could be 
problematic if the courts are faced with a different scenario to one of these three 
categories, for example one similar to that in Öneryildiz. Consequently, it is argued 
that the duty to investigate should be adapted to each public authority so that more 
guidance is provided on what kind of investigation and results are required. It is 
submitted that one way of implementing this would be to establish a body within each 
public authority that has responsibility for initiating the investigation, reporting the 
death to the coroner and ultimately acting on any recommendations made. This could 
provide some much needed clarity on what is currently a very vague and general, yet 
important, duty. It could also provide consistency of approach as at present 
investigations are conducted on an ad hoc basis, which can result in inconsistencies in 
how the law is applied. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE OPERATIONAL DUTY 
 
 
Following the recent decision in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust1 the operational 
duty under Article 2 has been expanded into new circumstances, within the context of 
healthcare, and a new emphasis has been placed on the role of vulnerability in 
triggering the duty. Whilst the decision in Rabone concerned a patient suffering from 
a psychiatric illness, the principles can also be applied to patients in hospital suffering 
from a physical illness, hereafter referred to as physical patients. This has resulted in 
several questions being raised, in particular about the role of state control and 
involuntary detention as relevant factors in engaging the duty. This chapter will 
consider the impact that Rabone has had on the operational duty and the questions 
that have been raised as a result of the decision. To do this it will look at the 
operational duty in general, the evolution of both ECHR and domestic law to the 
current position, the decision in Rabone and its impact on the law. Ultimately, the 
decision in Rabone will be defended and it will be demonstrated that although it has 
expanded the operational duty and has placed more importance on the notion of 
vulnerability in healthcare scenarios, this will not result in the duty becoming too 
broad. Rather, when the operational duty is applied based on the relationship between 
the public authority and the individual, and the function of the public authority, then 
vulnerability can be properly defined and only applied in certain circumstances, thus 
meaning that the duty can still be controlled as it previously has been. In doing so it 
will argue that state control is also still relevant in certain circumstances. It will also 
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consider the impact that Rabone has had on the class of victims that can claim under 
Article 2. 
 
Section One: The Positive Duties Under Article 2 
 
In addition to the positive investigative duty, Article 2 also places positive duties on 
the state ‘to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its 
jurisdiction’.2 There are two branches to these positive obligations: firstly, there is a 
duty to have an effective system in place to deter, and if necessary punish, unlawful 
killings. This duty was considered in Powell v United Kingdom,3 which established 
that there will not always be a breach of Article 2 where a death occurs in hospital. 
Rather, part of the positive duty operates at an organisational level and this will only 
be breached where there has been a systematic or organisational failing. Powell 
involved a claim by the parents of a child who died as a result of medical negligence 
whilst receiving treatment in hospital. It was held that as the hospital had in place a 
general framework for protecting life and ‘had made adequate provision for securing 
high professional standards among health professionals’4 then medical negligence 
resulting in death did not mean that there was a breach of the general duty under 
Article 2. The second positive duty is one to take preventive measures to safeguard 
the life of an individual in certain defined circumstances,5 and is referred to as the 
operational duty. This duty requires the state, and its organs, to take preventive 
measures to control the actions of third parties who may cause harm to individuals in 
certain circumstances that have been defined by the courts, which will be discussed in 
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Section Two. It is this operational duty that will be the primary focus of this thesis, 
specifically the duty that applies to health authorities. 
 
In Chapter One the law relating to the investigatory duty at ECHR level and at UK 
level were considered separately as there is disparity between the two approaches. 
However, where the operational duty is concerned there is no disparity and so in this 
chapter the law from the ECHR and the UK will be assessed together. When 
considering the operational duty, the UK courts appear willing to build upon, and 
develop, the ECHR law. In Rabone Lord Brown stated that ‘[i]f, however, the 
domestic court is content (perhaps even ready and willing) to decide a Convention 
challenge against a public authority and believes such a conclusion to flow naturally 
from existing Strasbourg case law (albeit that it could be regarded as carrying the case 
law a step further), then in my judgment it should take that further step.’6 Perhaps one 
reason behind this is that where the operational duty is concerned the ECtHR has 
provided more guidance on the circumstances in which the duty is likely to apply, 
although there is still a degree of flexibility over this. In contrast, as already 
discussed, where the investigatory duty is concerned there is less guidance from the 
ECtHR. In addition, this approach taken by the UK courts to building upon the 
operational duty can be contrasted with the approach taken in relation to expanding 
the investigatory duty, where there courts appear reluctant to depart from the existing 
model that they have created as to when the investigatory duty will apply.7 
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Section Two: The Role of State Control and Involuntary Detention 
 
The operational duty under Article 2 was first expressly developed in Osman v United 
Kingdom,8 which involved a schoolteacher who became obsessed with and harassed a 
pupil, eventually seriously injuring the pupil and killing his father. Although the 
ECtHR ultimately found no violation of Article 2, they developed a test for 
determining whether the operational duty applies and has been breached in cases 
where a public authority fails to protect a person from the criminal acts of a third 
party. It was said that there will have been a breach of the operational duty if ‘the 
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal 
acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their 
powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk’.9 
However, it will be argued this basic test for determining whether the operational duty 
is engaged is only relevant once it has been shown that there is a relationship between 
the victim and the public authority that is capable of raising the duty. A relationship 
that requires the public authority to protect individuals would engage the duty. By 
focusing on this relationship before applying the Osman test different factors that 
engage the duty can be considered depending on the public authority involved, for 
example detention and vulnerability. In Osman the basis for the duty arising in police 
cases has not been fully explained and it is unclear whether the duty arises here 
because it is a function of the police to protect individuals from criminal 
behaviour/harm or whether there must be an additional, explicit, assumption of 
responsibility before the duty is engaged. This latter view was implied by Lord Hope 
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in Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire, where he stated that ‘[t]here are 
undoubtedly cases where things done by the police can give rise to negative or 
positive duties under article 2 if life is to be protected.’10 This would have the effect 
of providing a further control over situations in which the duty can be engaged and 
would prevent an influx of litigation. As this thesis is concerned primarily with health 
authorities, this question of why the operational duty applies to the police will not be 
answered here. However, it is arguable that the police function is conducive to Article 
2 operational duties on the basis that it directly concerns the control and protection of 
individual members of the public. Although this does mean that the duty is wider 
initially, it can then be limited sufficiently through the application of the Osman test 
and so will not always result in the duty being engaged. 
 
Since Osman the circumstances in which the operational duty applies have been 
gradually expanded by the courts. In Keenan v United Kingdom11 the ECtHR held that 
the duty could apply to prisoners at risk of suicide. Keenan involved a claim under 
Article 2 by the mother of a mentally ill prisoner who committed suicide whilst in 
prison. The court extended the Article 2 duties to apply in cases involving prisoners at 
risk of self-harm based on the reasoning that prisoners are in a vulnerable position due 
to their involuntary detention, and the state control that is exercised over them as a 
result of this detention, and so ‘the authorities are under a duty to protect them’.12 In 
Edwards v United Kingdom13 the duty was extended to apply in circumstances where 
prisoners are at risk from other prisoners. Edwards involved a claim under Article 2 
by the parents of a prisoner who was killed by his cellmate. Again the ECtHR 
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12 ibid [90]. 
13  [2002] 35 EHRR 19.s 
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highlighted that as he was a prisoner the victim ‘fell under the responsibility of the 
authorities who were under a domestic law and Convention obligation to protect his 
life’14 and that the Osman test should be applied to determine if there had been a 
breach of this positive obligation. As a result of these cases it appeared that the 
operational duty was most applicable in circumstances involving people in custody 
who were at risk of either harm from a third party or at risk of self-harm. The duty has 
since been found in cases involving conscripts, where the duty is to protect conscripts 
against the risk of suicide.15 In Kilinç v Turkey,16 the ECtHR has indicated that there 
are two factors that indicate the existence of the operational duty in these cases: i) ‘the 
nature of the military activities and assignments in which the recruits will have to 
engage’ and ii) ‘the “human element” which comes into play when a State calls upon 
ordinary citizens.’17 There has been no specific articulation of what it is about these 
circumstances that engages the duty, however, Lord Rodger speculated that both 
being under the control of the state and being ‘placed in situations where… there is a 
heightened risk of suicide’ are relevant factors.18 Thus expanding the circumstances 
where state control is relevant in giving rise to the operational duty. 
 
More importantly for the purpose of this thesis, the UK courts have since expanded 
the operational duty so that it applies in cases involving health authorities. Following 
recent developments, the duty now applies in scenarios where a patient has been 
harmed by a third party or has self-harmed and wishes to hold the health authority 
liable under Article 2 for failing to prevent the harm. In Savage v South Essex 
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Partnership NHS Foundation Trust19 the House of Lords held that the duty could 
apply to patients detained in a psychiatric hospital. Savage involved a paranoid 
schizophrenic patient who was detained in a psychiatric hospital under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 but who escaped and committed suicide. Her daughter sued the 
health authority claiming that it had breached the Article 2 operational duty owed to 
her mother. The House of Lords held that a duty was owed by all health authorities to 
protect the lives of patients, and that this included taking reasonable steps to prevent 
patients committing suicide where the staff knew, or ought to have known, of a real 
and immediate risk of suicide.  This demonstrated a willingness to expand the duty 
beyond the traditional scenarios in which it had been previously applied, for example 
custodial scenarios and cases involving conscripts.20 However, this was not an 
especially radical expansion of the duty as the House of Lords asserted that the basis 
for the duty arising remained rooted in the control exercised over the victim as a result 
of their involuntary detention,21 thus likening the facts to those involving prisoners 
and conscripts. 
 
Section Three: A Duty Based on Vulnerability 
 
The Supreme Court has since expanded the operational duty in relation to health 
authorities further through its decision in Rabone. This case involved a voluntary 
psychiatric patient, Melanie Rabone, who was admitted to hospital to receive 
treatment for depression following a suicide attempt. Whilst on home leave Melanie 
committed suicide. Her parents sued the hospital both in negligence, a claim that was 
later settled, and for breach of Article 2. The Supreme Court held that the operational 
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duty could also apply to voluntary patients due to their vulnerability, thereby 
expanding the type of situations in which it can arise beyond prisons and secure 
hospitals where patients are involuntarily detained. In doing so they placed an 
emphasis on the vulnerability of the patient, rather than on their status as a detained or 
voluntary patient. In addition, Rabone expanded the class of victims who can claim 
under Article 2, by allowing the parents of an adult to succeed in their claim and by 
allowing the claim despite Melanie’s parents settling their claim in negligence. By 
extending the duty in this way the Supreme Court have raised three main questions 
that remain unanswered: i) how far the operational duty can, and will, expand in 
relation to both health authorities and other public authorities following the emphasis 
on vulnerability when considering if the operational duty is engaged (and whether this 
changes the role of state control in triggering the duty), ii) the definition of 
vulnerability, and, iii) who is entitled to claim under Article 2 as a victim. This 
chapter will discuss these issues raised in Rabone and will attempt to provide more 
clarity over these uncertainties that now exist in the law. 
 
(i) The Extension of the Operational Duty 
 
Following the decision in Rabone concerns have been raised over how far the 
operational duty will now apply and whether it will continue to expand in the future. 
In particular, Tettenborn has raised concerns that the duty will now apply too broadly 
both to health authorities and to other public authorities.22 Firstly he argues that in 
Rabone the Supreme Court ‘waved away as an irrelevance’ the notion of state control 
over the individual as being an important factor in engaging the operational duty, and 
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instead placed more importance on the vulnerability of patients.23 By removing this 
distinction between the two types of patient the Supreme Court have created a wider 
duty that no longer appears to be based on involuntary detention. As a result it is 
questionable whether control is still a relevant factor in engaging the duty, which 
could potentially change the nature of the operational duty. It may result in health 
authorities being under a duty to protect all vulnerable patients from risks thus 
creating ‘a sort of general safety-net for the vulnerable’.24 There is currently 
uncertainty over how far this duty will expand and Poole has suggested that as a result 
it may extend in the future to patients who are being treated in the community or to 
non-psychiatric patients who are vulnerable, for example those who are suffering 
from dementia.25 It has also been suggested that the duty may also apply to patients 
who are on home leave from hospital.26  
 
However, in making this argument Tettenborn appears to overstate the distinction 
between voluntary and detained patients. He argues that detention is an effective 
method of controlling the way that the operational duty is applied and that the 
decision in Rabone to replace this with the notion of vulnerability will lead to an 
increase in litigation.27  He acknowledges that the reasoning behind the decision is 
that ‘most voluntary patients could now under the revised Mental Capacity Act 2005 
be incarcerated almost at the whim of those treating them’ and that there is now ‘not 
so much difference between a detained and a voluntary patient’,28 yet this view is too 
simplistic. In reality, as Lord Dyson acknowledged, the difference between a 
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voluntary and a detained patient is less clear-cut. Lord Dyson stated that detained 
patients may be in ‘an open hospital with freedom to come and go’ and ‘an informal 
patient may be treated in a secure environment’,29 demonstrating that there is less of a 
distinction between the two types of patient in practice. In addition, a person may be 
detained by their condition and only receiving treatment in hospital voluntarily 
because if they did not consent then they fear that they would be detained anyway.30 
This suggests that there are many variables that can affect the nature of the detention 
and that deciding whether or not the operational duty applies on this basis is 
‘artificial’.31 Additionally, Hill identifies that voluntary psychiatric patients are not in 
the same position as patients with a physical illness.32 While both are admitted to 
hospital on a voluntary basis, there is a difference in their ability to make rational 
decisions over their treatment. This is especially an issue where anorexic patients are 
concerned, as while they may be capable of making certain rational decisions, they 
are often not able to make rational decisions about their treatment.33 These differences 
between the two types of patients suggests that, as their Lordships found in Rabone, 
distinctions should not be drawn between voluntary and detained patients, as 
voluntary patients are in a comparable position to detained patients, rather than one 
comparable to patients with a physical illness.34 Due to this, in scenarios involving 
health authorities, detention is not an effective mechanism for controlling the 
operational duty as to use detention as a control mechanism risks denying the 
protection of the duty to certain classes of people who need it. Further, as the focus in 
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Rabone was on vulnerability, rather than on detention, this reasoning can be applied 
to physical patients in certain circumstances where the Osman test is satisfied. Again 
this suggests that detention is no longer an effective mechanism for controlling the 
duty in healthcare scenarios, as it would also deny these physical patients the 
protection of the operational duty. 
 
It is also worth noting that although Rabone expanded the class of people that the 
operational duty applies to, it has not changed the Osman test itself and so the factors 
that act to limit the duty still apply. This will prevent the duty from applying too 
broadly to health authorities. The Osman test requires that the public authority ‘knew 
or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the 
life of an identified individual or individuals’.35 More is therefore required for the 
duty to apply than just the vulnerability of a patient. The risk must be of a certain 
nature before the operational duty is engaged: Osman identified that ‘a real and 
immediate risk to life’36 is needed to trigger the duty. Rabone provides the most 
recent, and detailed, consideration of what amounts to a real and immediate risk. Lord 
Dyson stated that for the risk to be real it must be ‘a substantial or significant risk and 
not a remote or fanciful one’.37 He also affirmed that immediate should be interpreted 
as meaning ‘present and continuing’, but asserted that the risk does not have to be 
imminent.38 Keenan also demonstrated that not every risk will trigger the operational 
duty.39 In Keenan it was held that although there was a risk to the deceased’s life, it 
was not immediate as the ‘immediacy of the risk varied’.40 This further demonstrates 
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that the operational duty will only apply in a limited number of circumstances, as its 
applicability will depend on the nature of the risk in question. Further, following 
Powell, the operational duty only applies to certain types of risks within the context of 
healthcare and so will not always arise. This would suggest that the operational duty 
can still be controlled, and its applicability restricted, through the existing 
mechanisms, for example by considering the nature of the risk41 and by applying the 
current criteria that determine breach, which will be considered in more detail in 
Chapter Three. 
 
Consideration of the risk involved means that following Rabone the operational duty 
can still be restricted to situations involving harm caused by third parties or self-harm. 
It has been suggested that at present Rabone only applies to psychiatric patients, and 
not to physical patients.42 Yet, there is a possibility that in the future the duty may 
apply beyond this in exceptional circumstances. For example, if a person is receiving 
treatment for a physical illness in hospital and the hospital knows him to be at risk of 
attack from a third party then it is arguable that they would be under a duty to protect 
him from harm. However, such an extension of the operational duty would only apply 
in limited circumstances as in these cases the risk of self-harm or harm from a third 
party is less obvious. The existence of the duty would depend upon the nature of the 
risk and the knowledge that the health authority had of it. For example, the courts may 
require the health authority to have had specific knowledge of the risk and so would 
consider the definition of knowledge from Van Colle. In Van Colle it was stated that 
hindsight cannot be used and that the question to be asked when determining 
                                                
41 Rabone (n 1) [24] (Lord Dyson). 
42  Bevan Brittan ‘Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust’ (Bevan Brittan, 20 February 2012) 
<http://www.bevanbrittan.com/articles/Pages/RabonevPennineCareNHSTrust.aspx> Accessed 7 June 
2013. 
   42
knowledge is whether the authority ‘making a reasonable and informed judgment on 
the facts and in the circumstances known to [them] at the time… appreciated that 
there was a real and immediate risk’.43 Liability in these circumstances can be 
compared to public authority liability for acts of third party harm and self-harm in 
negligence. Following Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis the police 
are under a duty in negligence to take reasonable steps to protect a prisoner from the 
risk of suicide where they had knowledge of the risk.44 This was confirmed in Orange 
v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, where the importance of knowledge of the risk 
was emphasised: ‘[t]he obligation to take reasonable care to prevent a prisoner from 
taking his own life deliberately only arises where the custodian knows or ought to 
know that the individual prisoner presents a suicide risk.’45 This indicates that the 
requirement of knowledge is an important factor in cases where a public authority is 
said to be under a duty in negligence to protect the life of an individual, and so it is 
also likely to be relevant when considering a future extension of the operational duty 
into similar circumstances. This comparison between liability in negligence and under 
the HRA 1998 for breach of Article 2 will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Four. 
 
To demonstrate how the duty would apply in practice, consider a scenario where a 
voluntary psychiatric patient, suffering from depression, on leave from hospital 
commits suicide. In such a case the operational duty would apply following Rabone, 
provided that the criteria for vulnerability, which will be discussed in Chapter Three, 
are met. The operational duty has been ruled to apply to voluntary psychiatric patients 
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by both the UK courts and the ECtHR46 and so the Osman test would be applied. 
Assuming that the individual was in a vulnerable position it would be considered 
whether there was a real and immediate risk using the interpretations provided in 
Rabone. This would depend on any assessments of the individual and their condition, 
however, provided that the behaviour was constant and did not vary, as it did Keenan, 
then it is likely that there would be a real and immediate risk, following Rabone. The 
court would then have to consider whether the health authority knew or ought to have 
known of the risk to the individual and then whether there had been a breach of the 
duty. The factors that are considered when determining breach will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Three. This demonstrates that the operational duty will not be 
too widely applicable in healthcare cases as the duty can still be controlled as it 
currently is using the Osman test, but with a clearer definition of vulnerability acting 
as a limiting factor that is specific to healthcare cases. In contrast, consider a patient 
suffering from a cancer that is misdiagnosed who dies whilst receiving treatment in 
hospital. In this instance, the Article 2 operational duty would not apply. Instead, the 
reasoning in Powell would be applied and the health authority would only need to 
satisfy the first limb of the positive obligations imposed by Article 2, which places a 
duty on the state to ensure that a general framework to protect life is in place, 
discussed above. Assuming that this is satisfied in this scenario there will be no 
breach of Article 2 and also no breach of the operational duty. This demonstrates that 
the decision in Rabone does not place onerous duties on health authorities, as Powell 
will still act to limit the situations in which the operational duty is applicable. 
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Both domestic and ECHR jurisprudence demonstrate that the operational duty is 
likely to expand in the future to adapt to new circumstances that arise47 due to its 
flexibility and the fact that there are no definite circumstances when the duty will 
apply.48 Poole has argued that the Supreme Court in Rabone have ‘not drawn any neat 
lines around the circumstances in which the operational duty might exist’,49 
suggesting that the duty is very vague. However, it can be argued that the operational 
duty was already vague before Rabone was decided: in Rabone itself Baroness Hale 
identified that the duty is often stated ‘in very broad terms’50 by the ECtHR and there 
are only guiding principles as to when it may apply. The factors that have been 
emphasised by the courts so far are: vulnerability, the type of risk involved and any 
‘assumption of responsibility by the state for the individual’s welfare and safety 
(including by the exercise of control)’.51 It can thus be suggested that the Supreme 
Court took advantage of this flexibility and have not made radical changes to the 
clarity of the operational duty. Instead, they have placed more emphasis on one of the 
existing concepts within the duty. 
 
Tettenborn’s argument also suggests that the widening of the operational duty will 
result in the duty applying too broadly to other public authorities as well as health 
authorities.52 Yet, when the nature of the operational duty is considered this is not 
necessarily true. It can be argued that the existence of the operational duty is closely 
related to the relationship between the victim and the public authority and so not all 
public authorities should be subject to the operational duty. Instead, whether the duty 
                                                
47 Poole (n 25) 133. 
48 Rabone (n 1) [22] and [25] (Lord Dyson). 
49 Poole (n 25) 129. 
50 Rabone (n 1) [69] (Baroness Hale). 
51 ibid [22] (Lord Dyson). 
52 Tettenborn (n 22) 328. 
   45
is owed to the individual should depend on the function of the public authority and 
whether they are required to control third parties or protect individuals as part of this 
function. Mitchell v Glasgow City Council53 can be used to highlight this. In Mitchell, 
it was found that a local housing authority was not under an operational duty to 
protect the victim from an attack by his neighbour as there was no real and immediate 
risk to the victim’s life. McIvor has argued that rather than considering whether there 
was a real and immediate risk, the operational duty could have been ruled out by their 
Lordships on the grounds that the duty ‘was entirely incompatible with the public 
purpose and function of a housing authority, and with the nature of the relationship 
which exists between a landlord and a tenant’.54 Only Lord Rodger discussed the 
functions of the public authority as being relevant to the duty to protect, stating that 
the police ‘were the public authority with the duty, and with the resources to prevent 
criminal violence’55 and that the victim ‘was not in the custody or control of the 
Council’.56 Allen has argued that Lord Rodger’s opinion in Mitchell may be based on 
the reasoning that ‘the protective duty is parasitic upon the general obligation’57 and 
so cannot apply if there is no Article 2 duty on the public authority. This thesis will, 
however, argue that the operational duty is independent of the general Article 2 duty. 
Whilst all public authorities are subject to the general Article 2 duty and the negative 
duty not to take life, if it is the special nature of the relationship between the public 
authority and the victim, with such a relationship being determined by the particular 
function of the public authority, that determines whether the public authority is 
subject to the operational duty then this will mean that not all public authorities are 
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subject to it. Instead, the operational duty will apply based on a two-stage test, firstly 
the function of the public authority and its relationship with the victim should be 
considered, as Lord Rodger did in Mitchell, and then, if the authority has a function 
compatible with the duty, the Osman test should be applied to determine if a duty was 
owed in the circumstances and if there has breach of this duty. In contrast to this, as 
discussed in Chapter One, there seems to be more debate over the relationship 
between the investigatory and the general Article 2 duties. It can also be argued that if 
the operational duty only applies to public authorities depending on their function 
then the duty must be independent of the investigatory duty under Article 2. It means 
that the operational duty is narrower than the investigatory duty as it only applies 
where a third party, or a risk of suicide, is involved and the public authority has a duty 
to safeguard life. In contrast, the investigatory duty is much broader as it is triggered 
whenever the State is involved in a death. 
 
In addition, if not all public authorities are subject to the operational duty then this 
raises the question of whether the test for the operational duty should be tailored to 
suit individual public authorities. The Osman test was developed in a case involving 
the criminal acts of a third party and in this context it makes sense and is useful for 
identifying whether the duty applies. In these scenarios factors other than 
vulnerability are more important as it is arguable that the operational duty on the 
police arises out of their function to control the acts of third parties, as mentioned 
above. Similarly, in custodial/prison cases detention and control are more important. 
In Mitchell Lord Rodger emphasised that ‘where a state has assumed responsibility 
for an individual, whether by taking him into custody, by imprisoning him, detaining 
him under mental health legislation, or conscripting him into the armed forces, the 
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state assumes responsibility for that individual’s safety’ and as a result are under a 
positive duty to protect these individuals.58 The test is less useful in cases involving 
health authorities, where other factors become more important. In these cases the 
vulnerability of the victim becomes a more important consideration due to the nature 
of the relationship between the victim and the public authority. In contrast, in police 
cases this assumption of responsibility is less likely to be found, unless the individual 
is taken into custody, as demonstrated in Van Colle where it was stated that ‘the 
Osman test remains the same’ and will not vary even where the individual is acting a 
police witness.59 This would suggest that state control does still have a role to play in 
triggering the operational duty, depending on the context in which the duty is being 
raised. 
 
(ii) The Role of Vulnerability 
 
Tettenborn has also raised concerns that following Rabone the emphasis of the 
Supreme Court on vulnerability has meant that the duty will be based on a concept 
that is too vague.60 In Rabone although the Supreme Court did place a large emphasis 
on the role of vulnerability in triggering the operational duty, they did not provide a 
definition of what vulnerability is. Lord Dyson simply referred to the emphasis that 
the ECtHR has placed on vulnerability in its jurisprudence ‘as a relevant 
consideration.’61 Baroness Hale, meanwhile, referred to the ‘special vulnerability of 
people suffering from mental disorders’ that has been noted by the ECtHR.62 Neither 
actually attempted to define vulnerability beyond this, which suggests that 
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Tettenborn’s concerns are valid as vulnerability does currently lack definition and so 
could potentially apply very broadly. However, whilst these concerns are justified the 
decision in Rabone itself is of less concern than he suggests. It can be argued that the 
importance of vulnerability can be restricted to cases within the healthcare context 
due to the health authorities’ protective function and so in other circumstances state 
control will remain relevant. The jurisprudence appears to show that in cases where 
victim is detained then control and assumption of responsibility are more important 
considerations than vulnerability itself. Therefore the functions of a public authority 
are relevant and so only certain public authorities can be subject to the operational 
duty. This can be demonstrated by contrasting the approaches taken in Keenan and 
Rabone: in Keenan it appears that vulnerability stemmed from the detention of the 
individual,63 however, in Rabone their Lordships suggest that vulnerability results not 
from detention, but from the assumption of responsibility by the hospital over the 
individual.64 Thus, in the healthcare context, it can be argued that is it the factors of 
reliance and dependence, which are both features of the patient/hospital relationship, 
that are most relevant when determining vulnerability where the operational duty is 
concerned. In addition, Lord Rodger acknowledged in Savage that the factors that are 
important in triggering the duty vary depending on the circumstances. When 
comparing the situations of prisoners and conscripts he noted that whilst state control 
is relevant to both, ‘the predicaments of prisoners and conscripts are different, the 
other factors which contribute to the risk, and so give rise to the obligation, are not the 
same. For instance, the “position of vulnerability” of the prisoners is stressed; the 
human reaction to being called up to do military service is mentioned in the case of 
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the conscripts.’65 Therefore by considering the relationship between the public 
authority and the victim as well the function that the public authority carries out the 
influence of vulnerability can be restricted to healthcare cases. If the operational duty 
is understood in this way then this would enable different tests to be applied to 
different public authorities, which would enable vulnerability, and what it is that 
makes an individual vulnerable, to be more clearly defined. By providing a clearer 
definition, the concerns of Tettenborn, over the loose definition of vulnerability 
following Rabone and fears that the duty will become too wide,66 would be addressed. 
The concept of vulnerability and the circumstances in which it will be relevant will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. 
 
Tettenborn also suggests that as there was no real definition of vulnerability given in 
Rabone this will result in increased litigation because it is ‘open-ended and vague’ 
and has created uncertainty in the law.67 However, as Baroness Hale asserted in 
Savage ‘it is hard to understand how applying the Osman/Keenan approach in these 
circumstances [to detained psychiatric patients] can add to the hospitals’ difficulties. 
They already face potential liability in negligence if they fail to take reasonable care 
of their patients.’68 As demonstrated by the above example involving a cancer patient 
dying in hospital from natural causes, it follows that expanding the operational duty to 
voluntary patients will not radically impact the amount of litigation as the hospital 
could already face liability in negligence, as they did in Rabone. Rather, the aspect of 
Rabone that could result in more litigation is the decision to widen the class of victims 
beyond those who can claim in negligence, as will be discussed in Subsection (iii). 
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(iii) The Class of Victims 
 
In Rabone, the Supreme Court allowed the parents of an adult child to be classed as 
victims, thus expanding the class of victims who can claim under Article 2.  Under 
section 7(1) of the HRA 1998 a victim can make a claim against a public authority 
that has breached a Convention right. A victim is defined in section 7(7) of the HRA 
1998 as a person who would be treated as a victim under Article 34 of the ECHR. 
Lord Dyson justified the decision to class parents as victims by highlighting the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence that has allowed family members to claim as victims under 
both the Article 2 investigative and substantive obligations,69 for example Edwards 
where it was the parents of the victim who brought the claim against the United 
Kingdom. Prior to this decision it was thought that the class of victims in English law 
was narrower than that under ECHR law, however, Rabone established that the 
ECHR jurisprudence applies in the UK as well. It is also significant that the Supreme 
Court allowed Melanie’s parents to be classed as victims despite having settled the 
claim that they made in negligence. It has been established that a person is no longer 
viewed as a victim if ‘the domestic public authority has (i) provided “adequate 
redress” and (ii) “acknowledged either expressly or in substance, the breach of the 
Convention”.’70 In Rabone the question that arose was whether or not Melanie’s 
parents lost this status as victims as they had settled their claim in negligence. Lord 
Dyson concluded that they had not lost their status as victims and could still claim 
under Article 2 ‘for damages for non-pecuniary loss for their bereavement’ as they 
had not settled this type of claim in negligence ‘because such a claim was not 
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available in English law.'71 Under English law claims relating to the loss of a child 
cannot be made by parents of a child over 18,72 which Melanie was. It has been 
argued that this has expanded the class of victims under the HRA 1998 too far as it 
has gone beyond those entitled to claim under the common law. As a result, ‘the 
courts will have to decide how to deal with claims by victims who were more 
distantly related to the deceased, where the relationship was a partnership outside 
marriage or same-sex, or where there are large numbers of relatives each claiming 
redress.’73 However, although this does expand the class of victims who can claim 
under Article 2, it is arguable that it will only be applicable in certain circumstances 
and allows for important rights to be protected and breaches compensated for where 
the common law does not allow such compensation or recognition of status as a 
victim.74 
 
In Savage, Lord Scott expressed reservations about whether Article 2 should be used 
to expand the class of victims already defined in domestic law. He argued that the 
claimant was a victim in relation to the investigatory duty as ‘[a]n important, and 
perhaps the main, purpose of the investigative obligation is to enable the family of the 
deceased to understand why and how the deceased died and who, if anyone, was 
responsible for the death.’75 He suggested that a claim under the investigatory duty 
would be more appropriate as the claimant was not acting to benefit financially, rather 
she was acting to obtain ‘the consolation of a formal vindicatory recognition that 
Runwell Hospital had failed in its duty to her mother’.76 In contrast, he argued that the 
                                                
71 ibid [58] (Lord Dyson). 
72 Fatal Accidents Act 1976, s 1A. 
73 Poole (n 25) 132. 
74 Rabone (n 1) [108] (Baroness Hale). 
75 Savage (n 15) [5] (Lord Scott). 
76 ibid [5] (Lord Scott). 
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class of victims that can claim under the operational duty should be limited to those 
already defined as victims under domestic law, as it is the role of the operational duty 
to protect individuals and domestic law already provides compensation to the 
deceased’s estate or dependants ‘in any case where an act or omission unlawful under 
civil law has caused death’.77 This approach appears to be a sensible one and reflects 
the fact that both negligence and ECHR law have some different legal functions and 
so each is suited to a different purpose, an argument that will be returned to in 
Chapter Four. These comments were rejected by the Supreme Court in Rabone, with 
Baroness Hale stating that parents ‘are victims, not only of the state’s failure to 
properly to investigate the death, but also of the failure effectively to protect their 
child’s life’.78 Hill has asserted that the reasoning behind this rejection of Lord Scott’s 
comments lies in the fact that they ‘wholly ignore s.7 of the HRA, by which 
Parliament expressly widened the possible range of claimants in HRA claims’.79 
Another explanation for this rejection lies in the function of Article 2 claims, and 
human rights law in general. Whilst Lord Scott argued that only the investigatory duty 
could be used to vindicate rights, others have argued that vindication can be achieved 
through other claims as well. Varuhas argues that human rights law itself fulfils a 
vindicatory function, which explains the wider class of victims who can claim, and 
that ‘actions by relatives may be the only “vehicle” for achieving the public finding 
that the deceased’s right to life was violated’.80 This vindicatory nature of human 
                                                
77 ibid [5] (Lord Scott). 
78 Rabone (n 1) [92] (Baroness Hale). 
79 Matthew Hill, ‘Analysis| Rabone and the Rights to Life of Voluntary Patients Mental Health Patients 
– Part 2/2’ (UK Human Rights Blog, 14 February 2012) 
<http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2012/02/14/analysis-rabone-and-the-rights-to-life-of-voluntary-
mental-health-patients-part-22/> Accessed 28th March 2013. 
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rights law, and the emerging vindicatory role of tort law that was identified in Ashley 
v Chief Constable of Sussex,81 will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
 
When the test for the operational duty was formulated in Osman it was designed to 
protect individuals from harm caused by third parties. The Court emphasised that the 
victim must be known to the authorities in order for the duty to apply82 and so from 
the outset the class of individuals who could claim was limited. As the duty has been 
found in new circumstances, the class of victims has also been expanded, as it was in 
Rabone. Hill argues that this ‘represents a welcome re-assertion of the fundamental 
importance of the notion that the Convention gives rights to individuals, and imposes 
obligations on state agencies to meet them’.83 Whilst a degree of flexibility is 
welcome, there must be some limits on who can claim under the duty due to its 
nature, for the operational duty imposes more onerous obligations on to the state, and 
thus public authorities, to take measures to protect individuals it has to be individual 
in its scope. Instead of applying to the wider public, the ability to claim depends upon 
the relationship between the public authority and the individual and so the class of 
people who can claim remains limited.84 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                
81 [2008] UKHL 25. 
82 Osman (n 2) [116]. 
83 Matthew Hill, ‘Analysis| Rabone and the Rights to Life of Voluntary Patients Mental Health Patients 
– Part 1/2’ (n 32). 
84 This can be contrasted with the investigatory duty. Although the scope of the investigatory duty has 
not been expressly considered, it appears that this duty does apply to the public in general. The 
investigatory duty is not individual in nature as this would entitle individuals to invoke the duty, rather 
than it being up to the state to instigate the investigation. It is submitted that rather than individuals 
claiming under the investigatory duty, the law would be clearer if independent third parties invoked the 
duty instead. 
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Since its development the operational duty has been expanded into new scenarios 
beyond that originally envisioned in Osman. This has resulted in a wider class of 
victims able to claim under the duty and appears to have contributed to the 
vindicatory element of the duty. Although the duty is more defined than the 
investigatory duty, it retains a degree of flexibility that enables this expansion to 
continue, meaning that it can continue to protect the rights of individuals who need 
this protection. The expansion of the duty into these new circumstances has also 
resulted in the question of whether the Osman test can continue to apply to all public 
authorities, and indeed whether the duty should apply to all public authorities. It is 
argued that the duty should not apply to all public authorities, instead this should 
depend on the functions that are carried out by the public authority and thus their 
relationship with individuals. This would enable the test for the operational duty to be 
further refined in relation to specific public authorities, and would mean that the 
concepts within it, such as vulnerability and assumption of responsibility, could be 
better defined. In relation to health authorities this would mean that vulnerability 
could be further defined, which would provide more clarity over when the operational 
duty applies in healthcare scenarios. If the operational duty is understood and applied 
in this way then the decision of the Supreme Court in Rabone can be defended as it 
does not widen the duty too much as feared,85 rather it allows it to continue to protect 
individuals and removes the distinction between classes of patients who are in similar 
positions.86 However, it is acknowledged that at present the decision does lack clarity, 
particularly in relation to the definition of vulnerability, and this will be the subject of 
the Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE - VULNERABILITY 
 
 
As highlighted in the previous chapter, the decision in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS 
Trust1 has placed a new emphasis on the role of vulnerability in defining when the 
Article 2 operational duty applies. Concerns have been raised that following this 
decision the definition of vulnerability is too vague and will result in the operational 
duty applying far too widely, increasing the amount of litigation in this area.2 
However, as the previous chapter demonstrated, this is not necessarily true as 
vulnerability is not applicable to all scenarios where the operational duty is raised. 
Instead its applicability can be limited to cases involving health authorities. This 
chapter will aim to identify a more precise definition of vulnerability that is specific to 
this field, thereby addressing some of the concerns of critics like Tettenborn,3 and will 
demonstrate how a duty based on vulnerability can work narrowly and effectively in 
practice, without the duty becoming too wide. It will also consider what else is needed 
in addition to vulnerability, if anything, to engage the operational duty. 
 
This chapter will then consider how the Osman test applies in practice once 
vulnerability has been established. This thesis is adopting the view that whether or not 
the operational duty applies is a two-stage test. The first stage of this test depends on 
the function of the public authority and its relationship with the victim; in cases 
involving health authorities this involves looking at the vulnerability of the victim and 
                                                
1 [2012] UKSC 2. 
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for a relationship of dependence between them and the health authority.4 Once these 
have been established, the second stage of the test applies the Osman test. This 
chapter will consider what amounts to a ‘real and immediate risk’ and the factors that 
determine whether or not there has been a breach of this duty. By considering these 
factors this thesis will demonstrate that although the operational duty has been 
widened following Rabone, it has not become too broad and can still be controlled. 
 
Section One: Defining Vulnerability 
 
To recap briefly on relevant points made in Chapter Two, since the decision in Osman 
v United Kingdom5 the ECtHR and the UK courts have developed the operational 
duty and attempted to explain more precisely when it may arise. At first the duty 
appeared to be most applicable in cases where the state was exercising control over 
the victim, for example in custodial cases. The ECtHR explained that the reasoning 
behind this lay in the fact that ‘persons in custody are in a vulnerable position’ and so 
‘the authorities are under a duty to protect them.’6 This position was reiterated in 
Edwards v United Kingdom.7 From these cases it appeared that state control and 
detention are important factors that indicate vulnerability, and consequently 
demonstrate a need for the protection of the operational duty. The UK courts have 
since expanded the duty into psychiatric healthcare cases where a patient is detained 
under the Mental Health Act 1983.8 In making this decision, Lord Rodger noted that 
the ECtHR has highlighted control over detainees as an important factor in custodial 
                                                
4 Where other public authorities are concerned these factors will vary, for example in custodial cases a 
relationship of control will be important in determining whether the operational duty applies. 
5 [2000] 29 EHRR 245. 
6 Keenan v United Kingdom [2001] 33 EHRR 38 [90]. 
7 [2002] 35 EHRR 19. 
8 Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74. 
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vulnerability,9 while Baroness Hale placed emphasis on the assumption of 
responsibility over the victim by the state.10 Thus when extending the operational duty 
to detained psychiatric patients the court focused on the fact that these patients are in 
a similar position to detainees as they too are subject to state control, which makes 
them vulnerable, and in need of protection, but, in addition, they are also vulnerable 
because of their psychiatric conditions.11  
 
Brennan has argued that the ECtHR justified the expansion of the operational duty 
into cases involving the vulnerable because of the control that the state exercises over 
the individual as through this ‘positive act of restricting the subject’s freedom… the 
state has increased the possibility of his coming to harm, either at his own hand or 
through some other means.’12 This can be linked to Tettenborn’s argument that the 
ECHR is ‘quintessentially an instrument about the exercise of State power’.13 
However, he uses this to argue that vulnerability should not be a relevant 
consideration; rather it is control that is more important in determining the 
applicability of the operational duty.14 Yet, in the existing jurisprudence it is hard to 
separate vulnerability and control as the two have often been mentioned in the same 
cases, for example in Savage.15 One reason for this may be that, as Stychin argues, 
there is a link between vulnerability and control as ‘the flipside of vulnerability is 
control on the part of the defendant, which underscores that it is the relative power of 
the parties that helps us to understand the relationship, and the ethical and legal 
                                                
9 ibid [33) (Lord Rodger). 
10 ibid [82] (Baroness Hale). 
11 ibid [49] (Lord Rodger); [97] (Baroness Hale). 
12 Carol Brennan, ‘One More Step in the Expansion of the “Right to Life”’ (2012) 28 PN 149, 154. 
13 Tettenborn (n 2) 329. 
14 ibid 329. 
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responsibilities that flow from it.’16 This suggests that in order to understand why the 
operational duty has arisen in a certain scenario the relationship between the parties 
needs to be considered. Where detention is concerned, although the victim may be 
vulnerable, it is the control exercised over them that is the more important factor. For 
example, although vulnerability has been mentioned in custodial cases, such as 
Keenan v United Kingdom17 and Edwards, as Lord Rodger acknowledged the ECtHR 
‘was only stating the obvious: unable to get away, [prisoners] are vulnerable to being 
assaulted or even murdered by a fellow inmate… to being bullied, to being 
blackmailed, or to being subjected to sexual abuse etc.’18 Therefore it was the fact that 
the prisoners were under the control of the public authority, and the public authority’s 
consequent assumption of responsibility for their protection, that engaged the duty. 
 
It is worth noting that this existing dicta on vulnerability comes from cases involving 
the exercise of state power over an individual, either in the custodial sense or through 
detention under the Mental Health Act 1983. As a result the concept of vulnerability 
discussed in these cases is different to vulnerability in the healthcare context, as non-
custodial cases can now be considered following Rabone. In healthcare cases 
vulnerability can be defined more precisely as it stems from a physical or mental 
condition and so its relevance can be restricted to these types of cases. It will be 
argued that outside of the healthcare context, vulnerability will not be determinative 
and that in these circumstances the operational duty will arise due to the existence of 
other factors, such as the exercise of control over an individual or detention. 
 
                                                
16 Carl F Stychin, ‘The Vulnerable Subject of Negligence Law’ (2012) 8 Int JLC 337, 345. 
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To make the argument that vulnerability is most applicable in healthcare cases, this 
thesis will now consider the impact that Rabone has had on the concept of 
vulnerability and its role in engaging the operational duty. In Rabone their Lordships 
highlighted that the victim’s mental state made her vulnerable,19 suggesting that 
mental illness is an important factor in determining vulnerability. It was stated that as 
a result of having a mental illness a person may ‘lack the ability to make an 
autonomous decision to take her own life’.20 From this, their Lordships were able to 
make references to an assumption of responsibility by the hospital over the victim and 
the potential to use legislation to detain her if necessary, demonstrating control.21 
However, in this case, rather than the exercise of control leading to vulnerability, as in 
custodial cases, it appears that it was the vulnerability of the victim that led to the 
assumption of responsibility over her. Consequently, it was the status of the victim as 
a psychiatric patient that made her vulnerable, as this affected her ability to make a 
rational decision and meant that she required the protection of the operational duty.22 
This analysis can be compared to reasoning given in cases involving Article 3 of the 
ECHR. Foster argued that where Article 3 is concerned, Keenan ‘clearly establishes 
that authorities owe an enhanced duty towards those placed in custody with mental or 
physical disabilities’ and that this is in part due to their ‘inability, in some cases, to 
complain coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any particular 
treatment.’23 This reasoning suggests that those with a mental or physical health 
condition are vulnerable and require extra protection. 
 
                                                
19 Rabone (n 1) [34] (Lord Dyson). 
20 ibid [105] (Baroness Hale). 
21 ibid [34] (Lord Dyson). 
22 ibid [30] (Lord Dyson). 
23 Steve Foster, ‘Prison Authorities and the Duty of Care and Protection of Prisoners’ Rights’ (2005) 10 
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By removing the distinction between voluntary and detained patients, Rabone has 
opened up the possibility of the operational duty applying to vulnerable patients with 
a physical illness as well. Whilst this creates the impression that the duty may now 
apply in more cases, in practice it can still be restricted and prevented from applying 
too broadly. Rabone demonstrates that vulnerability will naturally apply in cases 
involving psychiatric patients, however, the operational duty can then be limited by 
applying the Osman test and considering the factors influencing breach, as will be 
discussed in Section Two. Where physical patients are concerned, however, the scope 
of the operational duty will be much narrower. Where physical patients are concerned 
it will be harder to prove that the operational duty has been engaged, as a higher 
degree of knowledge of the risk of specific harm will be required. Where physical 
patients are concerned the risk is more likely to come from a third party due to the 
nature of the patient’s vulnerability. As will be argued, vulnerability stems from an 
inability to protect oneself. In cases involving physical patients this vulnerability will 
mostly likely come from the fact that they are physically weak and will be unable to 
protect themselves from third party harm, rather than the risk coming from harm they 
may cause themselves. In order to protect against a risk from a third party the hospital 
will require a high degree of knowledge of this threat, thus the second limb of the 
Osman test will be harder to satisfy.24 However, where a psychiatric patient is 
concerned the nature of the risk will be different and is more likely to be from self-
harm: ‘the likelihood is that, given the patient’s mental disorder, her capacity to make 
a rational decision to end her life will be to some degree impaired.’25 The operational 
duty is more likely to be engaged in these cases as the hospital should already have 
knowledge of the risk upon admission as the reason for the patient requiring treatment 
                                                
24 See discussion in Chapter Two. 
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would be due to their mental disorder. Therefore, although the duty has been 
expanded into new fields by the emphasis on the concept of vulnerability in triggering 
the duty, it can still be controlled and prevented from applying too widely. 
 
This raises the question of what it is in addition to vulnerability that gives rise to the 
operational duty, if anything. Stychin argues that ‘[t]he function of vulnerability is to 
help us to understand the ethical and legal connection between the two parties – the 
basis of the relationship that may give rise to liability’,26 suggesting that vulnerability 
alone may be enough to engage the duty. However, it can be argued that in addition to 
vulnerability, it is a relationship of dependence that engages the duty. The Department 
of Health defined a vulnerable adult27 as being someone over 18 ‘who is or may be in 
need of community care services by reason of physical or other disability, age or 
illness; and who is or may be unable to take care of him or herself, or unable to 
protect him or herself against significant harm or exploitation.’28 When a person 
enters hospital they may fall under this definition of vulnerability due to an inability 
to protect themselves and so will depend on the hospital for this protection.  
 
Where psychiatric patients are concerned this is supported by the jurisprudence on 
Article 3, as the courts are required to take into account the victim’s vulnerability and 
possible resulting inability to complain about their treatment, thus suggesting that part 
of their vulnerability lies in the fact that they are unable to protect themselves from 
                                                
26 Stychin (n 16) 346. 
27 It is submitted that those under 18 would automatically be treated as vulnerable and so in these cases 
a relationship of dependence would then need to be shown and the Osman test could be applied as in 
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such treatment.29 Bedford argues that vulnerability is important where people with 
mental illnesses are detained as ‘it demonstrates how mentally ill individuals are 
placed higher on a spectrum of dependency, whereby they rely heavily on others for 
protection and preservation of their well-being.’30 Although Bedford makes this point 
in relation to Article 3 detention cases, the reasoning can be applied to Article 2 cases 
even where a person is not detained. Due to their mental health condition, psychiatric 
patients depend upon the health authority for protection from possible harm that they 
may cause themselves because of their condition. It can be argued that this view was 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Rabone as demonstrated by the emphasis placed on 
the vulnerability of Melanie Rabone and the assumption of responsibility over her by 
the health authority. Both of these factors stemmed from her lack of ability to make a 
rational decision about ending her life and resulted in her needing the protection of the 
health authority.31 In contrast, where physical patients are concerned, as highlighted 
above, the risk is more likely to come from third parties, rather than from themselves. 
This is because their vulnerability will come from a physical weakness, rather than 
from their mental state, meaning that they may not be able to effectively protect 
themselves from third party threats. As a result, they will depend upon the health 
authority for a different kind of protection than psychiatric patients. Vulnerability 
demonstrates a higher dependence upon others for protection, and so the two factors 
of an inability to protect oneself and a relationship of dependence work together to 
engage the operational duty. This interpretation supports the argument that only 
certain relationships engage the operational duty and that this depends on the function 
of the public authority. Arguably, it is the function of a health authority to protect 
                                                
29 For example, Keenan (n 6) [111]. 
30 Daniel Bedford, ‘MS v United Kingdom: Article 3 ECHR, Detention and Mental Health’ (2013) 1 
EHRLR 72, 78. 
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patients and one characteristic of the relationship between a patient and a health 
authority is dependence.  
 
Rabone raises the additional question of whether cases involving outpatients can also 
engage the operational duty, or whether it will only be applicable in cases involving 
inpatients. It is submitted that the duty should also extend to vulnerable outpatients 
who depend upon a health authority for protection. The two stages of the Osman test 
should be applied in order to determine if the duty is engaged, however, it is likely in 
these cases that the second stage of the test and breach will be harder to establish. 
When assessing the second limb of the Osman test, knowledge will be harder to prove 
in cases involving outpatients due to the nature of the relationship between the patient 
and the health authority, as it is more distanced than that between an inpatient and a 
health authority. In addition, even if knowledge is proved, it will be difficult to show 
breach because of this distanced relationship: it may be hard to show that reasonable 
steps were not taken to prevent the risk. 
 
Section Two: Application of the Osman Test in Practice 
 
Although the Supreme Court has widened the operational duty by emphasising the 
role of vulnerability, this will not result in the duty applying too broadly, as critics 
have suggested.32 Firstly, as already argued, vulnerability can be narrowly defined so 
that it is limited effectively to cases involving health authorities and so will not 
always be a consideration that determines the scope of the operational duty. Secondly, 
as this section will discuss, once vulnerability and a relationship of dependence have 
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been shown, this does not necessarily mean that the operational duty was engaged, or 
even breached, in the circumstances. To determine this, the test defined in Osman 
must be considered and it will be asked if ‘the authorities knew or ought to have 
known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an 
identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they 
failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, 
might have been expected to avoid that risk’.33 Consequently, there are factors that 
will place limits on how broadly the operational duty applies. 
 
(i) Engaging the duty 
 
It must first be demonstrated that there was a real and immediate risk to life. 
However, there is speculation over what types of risks are covered by Article 2. Allen 
has argued that the risk must be ‘to life, not just to limb’ but that this is a ‘distinction 
often difficult to draw.’34 He questions whether actions such as wrist cutting or taking 
an overdose would amount to a risk to life35 and states that what is required is an 
‘objectively justified risk to life; a risk of serious injury resulting from self-harm 
would not suffice.’36 However, it is arguable that any risk that could realistically 
result in a threat to life can, and should, be considered under Article 2, and so an 
action that aims to end life, such as taking an overdose could be considered. 
Furthermore, in R (on the application of JL) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department37 it was held that the investigatory duty imposed by Article 2 was 
engaged where a prisoner attempted to commit suicide but was left with the 
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35 ibid 266. 
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possibility of a serious injury as a result. Although this case related to the 
investigatory duty and, as already argued, this duty is independent of the operational 
duty,38 it may be influential if a similar case were to arise involving a claim under the 
operational duty. There is therefore a possibility that the duty could apply to serious 
injuries that arise as a result of a suicide attempt. This in turn raises the question of 
whether the duty could apply to any injury that is sustained or only to serious injuries 
where the risk to life has not actually materialised. If it were to only apply to 
significant injuries then this would limit liability and prevent the duty from applying 
too widely, however, there is no direct jurisprudence on this question and so no 
definite answer can be provided. It is submitted that the duty should also apply in 
cases of serious injuries sustained even where the risk to life has not materialised. In 
JL Lord Rodger stated that the investigative duty would apply where a prisoner has 
attempted suicide and ‘even though the prisoner has not died, his life has been in 
danger.’39 This reasoning could be applied to cases involving the operational duty so 
that where a person has sustained serious injuries and his life has been threatened the 
duty could potentially apply, as long as the Osman test is satisfied. This would 
provide greater protection for victims, but the application of the duty could still be 
limited through the use of the Osman test so that it would not apply too broadly. If the 
operational duty was held not to apply in these cases involving serious injuries then 
this would leave a gap in the protection offered by the ECHR. A potential claim for 
these injuries could be made under Article 3, however, to establish this inhuman or 
degrading treatment needs to be demonstrated, which would be hard to prove.40 
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Hill argued that Rabone has ‘relaxed the test for finding a “real and immediate” 
threat’41 as Lord Dyson stated that to be real a risk must be ‘substantial and 
significant’.42 Hill points out that this is a similar test to that used by the common law, 
which is recognised as being a lower threshold to cross.43 The similarities between the 
Article 2 operational duty and the law of negligence will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Four, but it is submitted that the test for determining a real and immediate 
risk has not been lowered, as it will still be hard to demonstrate such a risk. Risk is an 
individual concept and must be judged on the specific facts of the case. As Allen 
argued ‘[p]redicting a person’s risk to themselves is an inherently unreliable 
exercise’44 and what amounts to a risk for one person may not be for another. 
Furthermore, certain risks are difficult to identify. For example, the risk of suicide can 
be particularly difficult to identify45 because a person’s behaviour can vary daily, as 
shown in Keenan,46 and the behaviour exhibited can differ from person to person. In 
addition, McBride has pointed out that a real and immediate risk may be hard to 
establish as it questionable how obvious the risk must be in order to be real and 
immediate: ‘[t]hreats do not have to be explicit in order to be taken seriously but those 
that are cryptic, as in Osman, need not be seen as compelling. Similarly behaviour 
open to various constructions can justifiably lead to a risk not being considered as 
serious.’47 This can also be seen in Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire.48 
Van Colle involved a claim against the police for breach of the Article 2 operational 
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duty for failing to take measures to prevent the death of Mr Van Colle, who was shot 
by a man who had been threatening and harassing Mr Van Colle and who was known 
to the known. Here it was said that the behaviour was ‘less clear and obvious’ than 
that in Osman, as it did not obviously show that there was a risk to the victim’s life, 
and so did not meet the required threshold to satisfy the Osman test.49 Consequently, a 
real and immediate risk will still be difficult to show, as there are many factors that 
can affect how a risk is interpreted. 
 
In addition to a real and immediate risk, the Osman test also requires that the 
authorities had, or ought to have had, knowledge of the risk. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, hindsight cannot be used and that the question to be asked when determining 
knowledge is whether the authority ‘making a reasonable and informed judgment on 
the facts and in the circumstances known to [them] at the time… appreciated that 
there was a real and immediate risk’.50 Both Lord Bingham and Lord Phillips 
considered what is meant by ‘ought to have known’. Lord Bingham argued that 
constructive knowledge means that ‘stupidity, lack of imagination and inertia do not 
afford an excuse to a national authority which reasonably ought, in the light of what it 
knew or was told, to make further enquiries or investigations: it is then to be treated as 
knowing what such further enquiries or investigations would have elicited.’51 Thus 
suggesting that constructive knowledge should be based on how a public authority 
acting reasonably should have carried out its obligations. Lord Phillips, meanwhile, 
provided two possible definitions: i) that it means ‘ought to have appreciated on the 
information available to them’, or ii) that it means ‘ought, had they carried out their 
duties with due diligence, to have acquired information that would have made them 
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aware of the risk’.52 He ultimately decided that the first interpretation is the correct 
one.53 Allen argues that this represents a lack of clarity over what is meant by having 
constructive knowledge of a risk,54 and so there is potential for the meaning to be 
debated again in the future. As McBride observes, the inclusion of constructive 
knowledge means that the operational duty is ‘not restricted to situations where the 
risk is effectively staring the authorities in the face; there is effectively a need to be 
open to the possibility that risks might exist.’55 However, whilst this inclusion of 
constructive knowledge appears to widen what amounts to knowledge, it can be 
argued that it is still limited by the fact that hindsight cannot be used. In Van Colle, 
their Lordships placed a lot of emphasis on ‘the dangers of hindsight’,56 showing that 
knowledge of a risk will still be hard to prove and so it will be hard to show that the 
operational duty applies. This view that the duty is limited by the first interpretation 
of constructive knowledge is also shared by Burton, who argued that the result of this 
interpretation is that ‘the duty is emptied of much of its content if it refers only to the 
information the police had and not information which they ought, with due diligence, 
to have acquired.’57 She argues that this places the police in a ‘reactive role’, which 
limits their liability58 and consequently limits the scope of the operational duty, 
especially where the police are concerned. 
 
(ii) Breach 
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It must also be remembered that simply because it has been established that there was 
a real and immediate risk that the authorities knew, or ought to have known, about, 
does not mean that there will have been a breach of the operational duty. Once this 
test determining whether the duty applies has been satisfied, additional factors must 
then be considered to determine breach. In Rabone Lord Dyson identified that ‘the 
standard demanded for the performance of the operational duty is one of 
reasonableness.’59 He supported this by stating that this standard allows for 
consideration of the wider circumstances, for example in Rabone an important 
consideration was ‘respect for the personal autonomy of Melanie’.60 The importance 
of considering other Convention rights has been stressed in other cases as well, for 
example in Savage Lord Rodger identified that ‘in particular the liberty and autonomy 
rights protected by articles 5 and 8’ should be considered.61 Baroness Hale, however, 
suggested that reasonableness may not be the standard for determining breach in 
every case: ‘[i]t may not always be enough simply to say that the experts were agreed 
that the decision to give her home leave was one which no reasonable psychiatrist 
would have taken. But in this case it also appears that there was no proper assessment 
of the risks before she was given leave and no proper planning for her care during the 
leave.’62 Hill argues that this has created a lack of clarity over the standard of breach 
and so there is potential for debate over it in the future.63 However, this can instead be 
used to demonstrate that the factors affecting breach will vary depending on the facts 
of the case. For example, as Baroness Hale asserts, in Rabone it was the decision to 
allow home leave without proper assessment that caused the breach of article 2 and so 
the reasonableness of the decision to allow leave from hospital must be considered, 
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however, in contrast, when determining breach in Keenan the ECtHR considered what 
further measures could have been taken to prevent his suicide.64 When considering 
breach the court must therefore take into account the circumstances of the case and 
the relationship between the victim and the public authority, which allows the duty to 
be moulded to the function that the public authority was carrying out at the time.  
 
This standard of reasonableness also allows for consideration of wider factors, for 
example the resources available to the public authority.65 In Osman it was noted that 
when interpreting the operational duty ‘the difficulties involved in policing modern 
societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which 
must be made in terms of priorities and resources’ must be considered.66 This shows 
that what is required by the duty to prevent the risk will vary depending on the facts 
of the case and the public authority involved. As Baroness Hale highlighted in 
Savage, resources can be just as important to consider in healthcare cases: ‘[t]he 
facilities available for looking after people with serious mental illnesses are not 
unlimited and the healthcare professionals have to make the best use they can of what 
they have.’67 Osman also established that the duty ‘must be interpreted in a way 
which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.’68 
This reiterates that when considering what steps the public authority should have 
taken to prevent the risk the court must not expect too much from the authority and 
again demonstrates that the duty will vary. Allen argues that this requirement of 
proportionality will limit how the operational duty applies as it means that not every 
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risk needs to be protected against as ‘it would be impossible to satisfy such an 
absolute standard.’69 Consequently, although the decision in Rabone has expanded the 
operational duty, breach will still be hard to prove and so the duty can still be 
controlled, which will prevent it from applying too widely. 
 
In Van Colle it was asserted that the test for the operational duty, as defined in 
Osman, ‘is one not easily satisfied, the threshold being high’.70 It was also 
acknowledged that the threshold is constant, and will not vary depending on the 
circumstances of the case.71 Yet despite this, it appears that how easy it is to prove the 
existence of the operational duty depends on the public authority in question and, 
more specifically, on the functions that it carries out. The existing jurisprudence 
suggests that in cases involving certain public authorities the operational duty is more 
likely to be found to exist and to have been breached. For example, in cases involving 
the police, such as Osman and Van Colle, it is unlikely that a breach of the operational 
duty will be found. In these cases the jurisprudence appears to show that the duty is 
less likely to be found either because knowledge is harder to prove, as it was in Van 
Colle and Osman, or for public policy reasons, for example concerns over defensive 
practice resulting or fears that there may be an increase in the number of claims. 
However, in cases involving prison services72 or health authorities73 a breach is more 
likely to be found. Poole has argued that this means that ‘the threshold is perhaps not 
as high as previously considered and may be more easily established in a healthcare or 
                                                
69 Allen, ‘Protecting…’ (n 36) 99. 
70 Van Colle (n 48) [30] (Lord Bingham). 
71 ibid [70] (Lord Hope). 
72 Such as Edwards. 
73 Such as Savage and Rabone. 
   72
prison setting where the risk of suicide is, or ought to be, assessed and recorded.’74 
However, this is not necessarily true. Instead it can be argued that the threshold is still 
high, but appears lower in cases involving certain public authorities because of the 
relationship between the public authority and the victim. For example, the police are 
relatively distant from victims and so it can be hard to establish that they knew or 
ought to have known of a real and immediate risk to the victim, as in Van Colle.75 In 
contrast, both health authorities and prison services have a closer relationship with 
victims and the courts have identified that the control exercised over detainees or the 
need to protect the vulnerable under their care are particularly important elements of 
these relationships.76 This suggests that it is not that the threshold is lower in these 
cases; rather it is the relationship between the public authority and the victim that 
affects how easy it is to satisfy the Osman test, as the duty itself is more applicable to 
certain relationships than others. 
 
To demonstrate how duty and breach would be assessed under Osman, consider a 
scenario involving a voluntary psychiatric patient, suffering from anorexia, who 
commits suicide whilst on leave from hospital. Given the criteria discussed above, and 
the decision in Rabone, it is likely that the patient would be classed as vulnerable, as 
well dependent upon the health authority for protection, and so the operational duty 
would apply to the relationship and may be engaged. In addition to the factors 
determining risk discussed in Chapter Two, the court would then have to assess 
whether the health authority knew or ought to have known of the risk and would then 
need to consider the factors that determine breach. Knowledge would be judged by 
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the test given in Van Colle and what was known at the time of the risk, without the 
benefit of hindsight.77 Again, this would depend on the circumstances of the case and 
on any assessments that were carried out on the individual in question when in 
hospital. If the patient was assessed as being at risk of suicide on admission, or if 
there had been an attempt at suicide before and this behaviour continued during the 
admission then it is likely that there would be knowledge of the risk, as there was in 
both Savage and Rabone. However, if there was no history of depression and no 
suicidal behaviour demonstrated during the hospital admission then it is unlikely that 
the health authority could be said to have had knowledge of the risk. If this were the 
case then it is unlikely that the operational duty would be engaged. If the duty were 
engaged, to assess breach it would be asked if the health authority did all that they 
reasonably could do to avoid the risk. This would depend on the reasonableness of the 
actions taken by the health authority in the circumstances. When assessing this, the 
court would need to consider the autonomy of the patient and the resources available 
to the health authority to prevent the risk.78 Factors which may be influential in 
healthcare scenarios would include the levels of observations that the patient was 
under and any decision made regarding allowing the patient home leave. In this 
scenario, if the patient appeared to be at a continued risk of suicide then the decision 
to allow home leave is not one that is reasonable, as in Rabone.79 This would result in 
a breach of the operational duty. 
 
Conclusion 
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The concept of vulnerability is most applicable in healthcare scenarios. When used in 
this context it can be properly defined and applied in a narrower and more controlled 
manner than critics have feared.80 Vulnerability has been mentioned throughout the 
Article 2 jurisprudence, but the majority of these cases have involved detention. As a 
result the concept of vulnerability discussed will differ as it relates to the control that 
is exercised over the person. In contrast, in healthcare cases vulnerability will stem 
from a psychiatric or physical condition. It will be expressed by an inability to care 
for oneself or protect oneself from third party threats, and will be coupled with a 
dependence upon the health authority for this protection. This distinction enables 
vulnerability to be interpreted in a narrower, context specific, way, preventing it from 
being applied too broadly. Although Rabone has widened the operational duty in 
healthcare scenarios, by extending its applicability to vulnerable physical patient as 
well as psychiatric patients, whether or not the duty applies can be limited, as a higher 
degree of knowledge will be required to engage the duty where a physical patient is 
concerned. It is also argued that in addition to vulnerability, dependence on the health 
authority for protection is needed to engage the operational duty, as this further 
emphasises that it is only certain relationships that will trigger the duty. Often, 
vulnerability and dependence will coincide and mean that the person requires 
protection from certain risks as they are unable to protect themselves and it is this 
combination that triggers the duty. 
 
Once vulnerability has been established, this does not necessarily mean that the duty 
will have been raised in the situation. To determine this, the Osman test must be 
considered and it will have to be established that there was a real and immediate risk 
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which the authorities had knowledge of, or ought to have had knowledge of. This 
limits the applicability of the operational duty as it means that although the duty could 
potentially have applied in a situation, because of the existence of vulnerability and 
dependence, in practice it was not engaged because the Osman test was not satisfied. 
It is argued that it will be hard to establish both a real and immediate risk and 
knowledge, especially following the decision in Van Colle as a very high threshold 
has been established.81 Furthermore, even if the test is satisfied and the duty does 
apply, this does not necessarily mean that there will be liability as breach still has to 
be shown, providing another hurdle for a claimant to surpass. Breach will be hard to 
prove as this stage requires the court to take into account all the factors of the case, 
including other Convention rights, and to decide if the public authority did all it 
reasonably could in the situation. This requirement of proportionality means that it 
will be hard to demonstrate breach as the public authority does not have to protect 
against every risk to life.82 
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CHAPTER FOUR: A COMPARISON WITH TORT LAW 
 
 
This chapter will consider liability in negligence for breach of a positive duty of care 
and will compare this to actions for breach of Article 2 brought under the HRA 1998. 
It will address the question of whether a distinction should be maintained between 
these two actions. To do this, it will consider the current position of the law, in 
particular the decision in Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex.1 Finally, it will suggest a 
way in which the law could be developed. It will be argued that actions in negligence 
for breach of a positive duty of care and actions brought under the HRA 1998 should 
remain separate due to the different functions of each, but that the law of negligence 
in relation to liability of public authorities should be developed so that it is more 
consistent with actions brought under the HRA 1998. The two should adopt the same 
approach at the duty stage, but should then take different approaches for the breach 
and remedies stages. Finally, this chapter will also consider how this applies 
specifically to health authorities. 
 
Section One: The Current Position 
 
It has previously been argued that following the implementation of the HRA 1998, the 
law on the liability of public authorities in negligence should be developed so that it is 
more consistent with actions brought under the HRA 1998.2 However, the UK courts 
have taken a different approach and have ruled that the two actions should remain 
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separate.3 In Smith the majority of the House of Lords adopted this position, with only 
Lord Bingham dissenting and expressing the opinion that the two actions ought to be 
harmonised. The main reasoning behind the majority’s opinion was that the two 
actions have different functions:4 whilst the aim of tort law is to provide 
compensation for injuries, claims brought under the HRA 1998 are “intended to 
uphold minimum human rights standards and to vindicate those rights.’5 In addition, it 
was asserted that the two also have important procedural differences. For example, 
Lord Hope pointed out that the common law has ‘its own system of limitation periods 
and remedies’,6 while Lord Brown expressed a similar view, only adding that ‘it is 
quite unnecessary now to develop the common law to provide a parallel course of 
action’ now that claims can brought for breach of Article 2 under the HRA 1998.7 In 
the conjoined case of Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire,8 which did 
involve an Article 2 claim, liability of the police was denied and as a result it has been 
argued that ‘[a] route to redress for police inaction that seemed to be opening up 
under the Convention has, at least partially, been closed down.’9 Arden has argued 
that the decision in Smith means that there will now only be development of the 
common law to become more consistent with human rights law ‘in specific cases 
where that is appropriate for domestic reasons’, unless ‘the Convention goes against 
the grain of some established position of domestic law’10. This was what happened in 
Smith, where the established position of the common law, as laid down in Hill v Chief 
Constable of West Yorkshire11 and Brooks v Commissioner of Police of the 
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Metropolis,12 was that the police do not owe a duty of care to protect individuals from 
harm caused by criminals, except in exceptional circumstances, and it was this 
position that prevented a duty from arising. Where public authority negligence is 
concerned it appears that the official judicial position is that claims in tort will remain 
separate to those made under the HRA 1998 and the two will not be developed 
together. 
 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust13 there 
was a ‘blurring of the line where tort stops and human rights begin’.14 Despite the 
official judicial position, in practice the position of the law is much more complex 
than having the two actions as either completely separate or completely harmonious. 
When considered together, there appear to be similarities between the two actions, 
which suggests that they should be developed together. In his judgment Lord Dyson 
referred to concepts that are used in negligence, for example his ‘discussion of 
assumption of responsibility, the nature of risk and the defendant’s awareness of it’.15 
In addition, Hill points out that Lord Dyson’s ‘juxtaposition of “real” with “remote or 
fanciful” is a common one in the domestic civil law’.16 Lady Hale also discussed ‘the 
duty to prevent suicide in terms of a balance between autonomy and the need to 
protect the susceptible’.17 It is perhaps understandable that their Lordships would 
make reference to concepts from the common law, as there is not enough clear 
guidance from Strasbourg beyond that given in Osman. For example, as discussed in 
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Chapter Three, questions still remain over what amounts to a real and immediate risk. 
Rabone is not the first judgment to liken ECHR and common law concepts: the Court 
of Appeal in Van Colle highlighted that the Osman test makes a reference to police 
resources when determining if the operational duty was owed and that these ‘policy 
considerations… are very similar to those which led the House of Lords in Hill and 
Brooks to conclude that no duty of care is owed’.18 Despite this, the ease with which 
the two sets of concepts are likened does suggest that there are some similarities 
between the two actions, meaning that, despite judicial opinion, the two actions 
cannot be seen as completely separate. In addition, to determine breach, Lord Dyson 
asked ‘[d]id they take all steps reasonably necessary to avoid the risk?’.19 Hill argues 
that this use of the test for negligence to determine breach of the operational duty also 
suggests that the distinction between common law claims and actions under the HRA 
1998 is lessening.20 However, as already argued in Chapter Three, this test will vary 
depending on the facts of the case and so, as Lady Hale pointed out, the common law 
test may not always be the appropriate test of breach,21 meaning that the two actions 
will not always be similar in this respect. Tettenborn has also suggested another 
similarity between the two claims by arguing that both achieve the same aim of 
compensation.22 However, this argument underestimates the vindicatory nature of 
claims brought under the HRA 1998, which Varuhas has argued justifies the decision 
in Rabone.23 Thus, although they may achieve the same results in certain cases, there 
are differences between the two claims, suggesting that, to an extent, they should 
remain separate. Consequently, there will not always be similarities between liability 
                                                
18 Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2007] EWCA Civ 325 [63]. 
19 Rabone (n 13) [42] (Lord Dyson). 
20 Hill, ‘Analysis| Rabone and the Rights to Life of Voluntary Mental Health Patients – Part 2/2’ (n 16). 
21 Rabone (n 13) [107] (Baroness Hale). 
22 Tettenborn (n 14) 329. 
23 Jason NE Varuhas, ‘Liability Under the Human Rights Act 1998: the Duty to Protect Life, Indirect 
Victims and Damages’ (2012) 71 CLJ 263, 265. 
   80
in negligence for breach of a positive duty of care and actions brought under Article 
2, but there are enough similarities to suggest that the two actions cannot, at present, 
be seen as either completely separate or completely consistent. 
 
Despite this emphasis on the differing functions, such as what the two actions aim to 
achieve, there are areas of overlap between the two. Varuhas points out that the 
concept of reasonableness and ‘the relevance of professional standards in assessing 
breach’ are important in both actions.24 Spencer has also highlighted that even the 
Osman test itself ‘[t]o the untutored eye… looks much like the sort of test the English 
courts would apply in deciding if the police were negligent’.25 This indicates that 
there is force behind the argument that the two actions can, and should, be 
harmonised, which will be discussed in more detail in Section Three. There are, of 
course, however, areas where the two actions differ. For example, despite some 
similarities noted above, the two actions use different principles when determining 
breach. To determine breach in negligence an objective test is used and it is asked 
whether the reasonable person would have done what the defendant did. Where a 
professional is concerned, an objective test with a quasi-subjective element is used: 
‘[t]he test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to 
have that special skill.’26  However, when assessing breach of Article 2 an objective 
standard will be applied, and it must be shown that the public authority did not do all 
that they reasonably could to avoid the risk.27 Like the test of breach in negligence, 
the Article 2 test of breach does incorporate an element of subjectivity as it requires 
consideration of the available resources, amongst other factors. Yet, these additional 
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considerations mean that the test of breach for Article 2 is perhaps less onerous than 
that under negligence,28 suggesting that although they share some similarities, there 
are fundamental differences between the two. The focus of the tests for breach also 
differ in each action. As discussed in Chapter Three, the test for breach of the 
operational duty uses a proportionality test, whereas the test in negligence focuses on 
whether the behaviour of the defendant was reasonable. Du Bois points out that 
although the two appear similar as they both use concepts of reasonableness, they do 
differ: ‘while tort law focuses on the reasonableness of behaviour, human rights law 
focuses on the reasonableness of outcomes.’29 Therefore despite similarities in certain 
concepts, the focus is still different and so suggests that the two actions should remain 
separate. Where health authorities are involved the considerations involved at the 
breach stage will vary depending on whether the action is brought under the HRA 
1998 or in tort law. If brought under the HRA 1998 then the courts will be wider than 
it would be under negligence. The courts will have to consider the proportionality of 
the actions taken by the health authority, the other rights of the victim, for example 
rights to liberty and autonomy,30 as well as considering the available resources and 
any other actions that could have been taken to prevent the risk. However, if the claim 
were brought in negligence then the court would use the Bolam test to determine 
breach and so would focus on what the health authority actually did in the 
circumstances. 
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It has been acknowledged that the Osman test is ‘harder to establish than “mere 
negligence”’31 and this can partially be attributed to the differing components of the 
two tests. For example, in Rabone Lord Dyson pointed out that to make a claim in 
negligence it must be shown that ‘the risk of damage was reasonably foreseeable’ 
whereas Article 2 requires that the risk be real and immediate before the duty will 
even be engaged.32 Another difference between the two is the limitation periods: 
section 7(5) of the HRA 1998 places a limitation period of one year on actions 
brought against public authorities, whereas claims in negligence for personal injury or 
death can be brought up to three years after the negligent act or omission.33 Overall, 
actions brought under the HRA 1998 and actions in negligence have significant 
differences. 
 
Section Two: Should There Be A Distinction? 
 
The above discussion raises the question of whether there should be a distinct 
separation between actions brought in negligence and those brought under the HRA 
1998, or whether the two should be developed together. In order to address this 
question, this section will look at the underlying differences and similarities between 
the two actions and the functions that they carry out. It has been suggested that the 
‘mirror principle’ is also relevant here.34 This principle dictates that ‘domestic law 
should “mirror” developments in Strasbourg’.35 If this is accepted then it follows that 
the two actions should be merged as where rights are concerned it is important that 
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the ECtHR achieves the same level of protection across all member states36 and so it 
is important that domestic law be consistent with ECHR law. 
 
Although the two actions have some similarities, as acknowledged above, one 
suggested reason for maintaining the distinction is that the functions of each are very 
different. Du Bois uses this to argue that the two actions are fundamentally different 
and so each is suited to a different type of claim.37 Whilst tort law treats liability for 
omissions as highly exceptional and will not normally impose liability for an 
omission,38 du Bois highlights that the ECHR does not draw these distinctions.39 
Instead, the ECHR ‘goes well beyond prohibiting the infliction of harm’ and ‘[a]ll of 
the major substantive Convention rights have... a “positive” dimension alongside their 
“negative” dimension, imposing extensive duties on states to take positive measures 
to the benefit of right-holders.’40 This suggests that tort law’s reluctance to impose a 
duty of care in cases involving omissions ‘results in a refusal to examine the 
reasonableness of failures to comply with such positive duties, while human rights 
law engages in such examination as a matter of course.’41 
 
Further, public authority liability in tort has been built upon the principles of personal 
liability, rather than developed on its own. This can be contrasted with French law, 
which adopts a system where public and private liability are treated separately, with 
public liability claims being dealt with by separate administrative courts. Nolan states 
that this is due to ‘revolutionary ideology’, meanwhile in the UK ‘the influence of the 
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Diceyan principle of equality before the law meant that it was special treatment of 
state organs that was taboo.’42 Whilst the UK’s approach means that tort can 
appropriately deal with actions against public authorities where negative rights are 
concerned, it can create problems where there is a positive duty to act, as these 
obligations are different to those that exist between individuals.43 The HRA 1998 
imposes positive, as well as negative, obligations on to states and ‘[t]hese are based 
on the premise that the state has special responsibilities in virtue of its special role in 
society as authoritative manager of common resources.’44 In contrast, tort law ‘serves 
to resolve conflicts among right-holders.’45 The obligations imposed on the state by 
the HRA 1998 also mean that the acts/omissions distinction in tort makes it less 
suitable for claims involving breaches of duties imposed on the state by the HRA 
1998.46 The ECHR places obligations on to the state and imposes liability where these 
obligations have been breached; in contrast negligence focuses on the liability of 
individuals and public authorities. Tension is created, however, as the HRA 1998 is 
based on the ECHR, but the obligations are imposed on public authorities and so they 
become individually liable for breaches, rather than the state as a whole being liable. 
As a result, the HRA 1998 can be likened more to the law of negligence rather than to 
ECHR law. Overall, the state has different responsibilities to individuals and so the 
liability of public authorities ‘requires a different approach’.47 This suggests that 
claims involving public authority liability are better dealt with separately to actions in 
tort, as the basis of liability is different to that of personal liability. 
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Furthermore, Nolan argues that to make the two actions more consistent the 
acts/omissions distinction would need to be ‘abandoned’ and that this would be 
‘problematic’.48 He argues that this principle ‘is foundational to the law of 
negligence… and the undermining of that distinction in public authority cases might 
therefore be expected to produce a degree of incoherence’ as it would create different 
rules for public and private parties, introducing a new public/private distinction into 
tort law.49 This demonstrates the problem that arises from public authority liability 
being built upon private law principles, as public and private law appear to require 
different approaches, which the HRA 1998 already allows for, suggesting that the two 
actions should remain separate. In addition, he suggests that commentators often 
overlook this acts/omissions distinction and ‘[focus] instead on what they perceive as 
policy objections to negligence liability in omissions cases, which they often wrongly 
describe as giving rise to an ‘immunity’, as though the public authority involved is 
being protected from a liability to which a private party would be subject.’50 
However, whilst there is some force to this argument as this does suggest that the two 
actions should be treated separately as different approaches are required for public 
and private liability, the courts do appear to more readily rely on public policy to deny 
a duty where certain public authorities are involved. For example, the House of Lords 
in Brooks simply upheld the policy reasoning used in Hill to deny a duty owed by the 
police and failed to distinguish the two cases on the grounds that whilst Hill was a 
third party liability case, Brooks involved ‘straightforward misfeasance’.51 This can 
be contrasted with the approach taken in Phelps v Hillingdon LBC,52 where although 
                                                
48 Donal Nolan, ‘Negligence and Human Rights Law: The Case for Separate Development’ (2013) 76 
MLR 286, 304. 
49 ibid 304. 
50 ibid 305. 
51 McIvor (n 28) 142. 
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it was said public policy could be taken into account, it did not prevent a duty being 
owed by a local education authority to pupils with special educational needs. 
 
In addition, du Bois argues that the two are suited to different types of claims because 
of the different justifications behind each area of law.53 The basis of tort law lies in 
corrective justice, as it aims ‘at rectifying an injustice that has occurred between the 
doer and the sufferer of harm’, and this affects the way in which tort approaches 
liability and determines the available remedies.54 Du Bois argues that this also results 
in tort law being unsuitable for claims involving breaches of rights as using tort law to 
vindicate rights would risk turning it into a mechanism of achieving distributive 
justice.55 Instead he argues that it is more suited to compensating for damage caused. 
As already noted, tort law draws distinctions between acts and omissions and also 
requires that there is a link between the claimant and the defendant, which is different 
to their relationship with the rest of society.56 He argues that these main features of 
tort law are not suited to distributive justice, and so suggests that claims involving 
rights, and vindication of rights, are better dealt with under the HRA.57 However, in 
practice these distinctions between corrective and distributive justice cannot be drawn 
as easily as Du Bois suggests. Whilst it is true that there are corrective justice aspects 
to tort law, and it does act to provide compensation for victims, there are also non-
corrective justice aspects to tort law. 
 
Recently, it has been suggested that tort law also has a vindicatory function, which 
would suggest that the two actions can be developed together as there is less of a 
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55 ibid 598. 
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distinction between their functions than previously thought. Lord Scott expressed this 
view in Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex,58 citing Lord Hope’s view in Chester v 
Afshar that ‘[t]he function of the law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to 
provide remedies when duties have been breached.’59 In Ashley the victim was shot 
by the police and his relatives brought claims against the police in both negligence 
and assault and battery. The claim in negligence was settled, but the House of Lords 
allowed the claim in assault and battery to proceed, with Lord Scott expressing the 
view that damages could provide compensation as well as fulfilling ‘a vindicatory 
purpose’.60 Arden compares this to cases brought under the HRA 1998, where 
‘vindication is the very thing that the applicant really wants.’61 In contrast, it was 
argued by Lord Brown in Smith that the sole purpose of civil actions is to 
‘compensate claimants for their losses’, while Convention claims aim to ‘uphold 
minimum human rights standards and to vindicate those rights.’62 However, this view 
is too simplistic, in practice the two actions overlap more than Lord Brown suggests. 
Lord Scott’s dicta in Ashley demonstrates that tort law also has a vindicatory purpose, 
and similarly claims under the HRA 1998 can also be used to achieve compensation.63 
This view in Smith provides a direct contrast with that expressed by Lord Scott in 
Ashley, suggesting that there is little clarity over the purposes of tort actions where 
human rights are involved.64 
 
Steele argues that even where tort law is used to vindicate rights, there can still be a 
distinction between the two actions as the definition of vindication can vary: it can 
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mean ‘vindication of the claimant’s right for the claimant’s benefit; or vindication of 
the “right”, for the purpose of securing that right in the public interest.’65 On this 
understanding, vindication in tort law is focused on the rights of the individual and 
ensuring that they do not suffer a loss or detriment, however, where actions under the 
HRA 1998 are concerned vindication is for social, rather than individual, purposes. 
Yet this emerging vindicatory function of tort law suggests that the two actions should 
be developed together, as although Article 2 can operate in a wider social sense to 
uphold rights in general, where individual cases are concerned it is likely that the 
reason behind the claim is ‘the desire for a proper investigation into what went wrong, 
with the possibility of a public condemnation at the end’.66 This would suggest that 
both actions can operate to vindicate individual rights, but whilst the ECHR operates 
in a wider sense, tort is focused on the individual. As a result, it will be argued that 
two actions should be more consistent at the duty stage because there are similarities 
that exist between them. However, there are also substantial differences, which mean 
that they should remain separate where breach and remedies are concerned. 
 
Section Three: Suggestions for Development of the Law 
 
Arden has argued that although it was mainly Lord Scott in Ashley expressing the 
view that tort law can also be used to vindicate rights, this demonstrates the impact 
that human rights law has had upon the common law and suggests that there may be 
development of the common law in the future.67 This could open the possibility that 
whilst the two areas of law remain separate, areas of the common law could be 
developed to become more consistent with human rights law. The decision in Smith 
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appears to have curtailed this as the majority expressed the view that not only should 
the common law remain separate to human rights law, the former should not be 
developed alongside human rights law either.68 However, Lord Bingham’s dissent 
could perhaps provide an opportunity for such development in the future. 
 
It is argued that due to these similarities, the law on the liability in negligence for 
breach of a positive duty should be developed so that the duty stage is more consistent 
with that in actions under the HRA 1998 and that ‘[a] claim in negligence should, on 
the appropriate facts, have regard to the duties imposed and standards required by 
Article 2 of the Convention’.69 In Smith, when giving his dissent Lord Bingham 
argued in favour of the ‘liability principle’ under which a duty would be owed if ‘a 
member of the public (A) furnishes a police officer (B) with apparently credible 
evidence that a third party whose identify and whereabouts are known presents a 
specific and imminent threat to his life or physical safety, B owes A a duty to take 
reasonable steps to assess such threat and, if appropriate, take reasonable steps to 
prevent it being executed.’70 Although the majority rejected it, this principle would 
operate in a similar way to the Osman test and would provide more consistency 
between the two actions at the duty stage.71 A test of duty based on human rights 
jurisprudence would ensure consistent protection of rights under the common law as 
well, whereas at present the chances of a duty being found seems to depend on which 
claim is brought. For example, the Court of Appeal in Smith acknowledged that ‘the 
assumed facts arguably demonstrate a breach of Article 2 of the European Convention 
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on Human Rights’,72 yet the House of Lords denied a common law duty.73 This 
decision in Smith has resulted in the common law test of duty being set at a very high 
threshold, where the police are the public authority involved. By denying a duty of 
care the judgment appeared ‘to leave no scope for protection of the individual within 
the framework of negligence’74 as the principle from Hill was applied to prevent a 
duty from arising. Yet at the same time, the conjoined decision in Van Colle affirmed 
that the Osman test is very hard to satisfy, but still appears to easier to satisfy than 
that under the common law.75 However, there is no logical reason for such a disparity 
between the two tests as where duty is concerned the two claims ‘rely on the same 
facts and, essentially, the same considerations arise’.76  
 
Where health authorities are involved, the duty under the HRA 1998 would be to do 
all reasonably possible to protect victims from a real and immediate risk to life that 
they knew, or ought to have known of, for example a risk from a third party threat or 
from self-harm. In contrast, the duty under the common law would be to do take all 
necessary steps to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm being caused to a victim that 
was known to them. Nolan, however, argues that the two actions differ significantly 
where the content of this duty is concerned. He argues firstly that these actions in 
negligence are concerned the risk that is required only needs to be from personal 
injury, but Article 2 requires a risk of death before the duty is engaged.77 
Consequently, if the two are merged then this would result in ‘introducing what 
                                                
72 Smith (CA) (n 69) [48] (Pil LJ). 
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would at the duty stage be an alien distinction between threats to life and threats of 
personal injury.’78 However, although at present the duty under Article 2 only applies 
where there is a risk to life, it has been argued in Chapter Three that the duty should 
also apply where serious injuries have been sustained and there has been a threat to 
life, even if this threat has not materialised. If the Article 2 duty were developed in 
this way then the difference between this and the duty under the common law would 
be lessened. In addition, Nolan argues that claims brought under Article 2 do not 
require actionable damage, whilst claims brought under the common law do.79 He 
points out that under Article 2 compensation can be sought ‘for forms of harm which 
are not themselves actionable in negligence, such as distress, anxiety, inconvenience 
and feelings of injustice, helplessness or humiliation.’80 Meanwhile, the common law 
only allows claims to be brought for recognised psychological harm in exceptional 
circumstances, and even then only allows claims to be brought for recognised 
psychiatric illnesses.81 The remit of what exactly can be claimed for under the 
common law is beyond the remit of this thesis, as the primary concentration is on the 
operational duty, however, it is acknowledged that this could result in difficulties in 
merging the two actions. It is perhaps arguable, however, that these differences can be 
dealt with at the remedies stage, however, as where Article 2 is concerned this 
damage is the result of a risk to life, and not the sole reason for the claim being 
brought.  
 
However, although there are some similarities between the two actions, there are also 
important differences. The difference in functions, highlighted above, suggests that a 
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degree of separation between the two actions is still necessary. In order to satisfy the 
differing functions and purpose both the breach stage and the available remedies 
should remain different. Where breach is concerned the two actions should remain 
separate due to the differing functions of each action. As already suggested, actions 
under the HRA 1998 seek to vindicate individual rights, but also act to uphold and 
vindicate rights in the general sense,82 whereas actions in tort are individual in nature. 
As a result, a distinction should be maintained between the two actions where breach 
of duty is concerned as different considerations are involved in each. Where HRA 
1998 claims are concerned, and the rights of society are being protected, there must 
be a wider consideration of others factors when determining breach. The Osman test 
already allows for such consideration by including a proportionality test to determine 
breach, however, in contrast, the test in negligence only requires consideration of the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s behaviour.  
 
Again, where remedies are concerned the distinction should also be maintained. 
Steele has criticised the functional justifications for maintaining the distinction given 
in Smith for being too ‘simplistic’.83 In making this argument, she was primarily 
focused on remedies in tort and under the HRA 1998 and what is remedied by both 
actions.  However, as she acknowledges, different issues are involved where remedies 
are concerned.84 This suggests that the focus on functions is perhaps more relevant 
where substantive issues, such as duties, are concerned but where remedies are 
concerned there does need to be a difference between the two types of claims.85 She 
argues that the remedies available under the HRA 1998 and those available in 
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common law claims need not be the same because the ‘mirror principle’ does not 
apply to remedies as ‘it has not been suggested that the main business of [the ECtHR] 
is to determine uniform levels of compensation that should be secured in domestic 
law toward those whose rights have been violated by a public authority’.86 In addition, 
although Steele criticises it as being too ‘simplistic’,87 the functional differences of 
the two actions also provides a reason for maintaining a distinction between the two 
where remedies are concerned. These differences mean that there are different 
considerations when determining remedies: one aim of tort law is to provide 
compensation and so the remedies available are ‘modelled on the loss, damage or 
violation suffered by the claimant or, where appropriate, on the sum required to 
“punish” the defendant’, whereas ‘awards of damages under the Convention (and thus 
under the HRA) [depend] on a much broader range of factors’.88 
 
Furthermore, claims brought under the two actions have different aims, suggesting 
that a distinction should be, in part, maintained. These differing functions are easier to 
address at the breach stage, rather than at the duty state, as the different approaches to 
breach allow for different considerations to be taken into account, and so different 
aims can be fulfilled by each. This suggests that when considering breach the two 
actions should remain separate. Tettenborn argues that ‘the tort of negligence, being 
bound to provide a general protection, must aim within reason at universality and 
consistency’, whilst ‘the fault-based remedies as demanded by art. 2 of the ECHR are 
essentially gap-filling and exceptional: here, the need to provide a seamless law of 
negligence as a whole is hardly relevant.’89 On this argument, tort law needs to 
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provide certain standards for determining whether a duty of care existed that can be 
applied to every case ‘and if a remedy is denied in one case and given in another, 
there must be a plausible reason to distinguish between them.’90 Tettenborn suggests 
that ECHR law, in contrast, does not need to operate in quite the same way.91 
However, ECHR law does still need to ensure consistency, but whilst tort is 
individual and aims to achieve consistent treatment of individuals, the ECHR needs to 
achieve a general consistency of protection of rights and in doing so each case will 
not be treated in the same way as the considerations for each will vary depending 
upon the facts. This is perhaps most relevant where remedies are concerned: Steele 
argues that tort law ‘remedies rights violations for the benefit of the individual 
claimant, while the HRA is interpreted as vindicating and protecting “Convention 
rights” in a more general sense.’92 This suggests that where remedies are concerned, 
the two actions do need to remain separate as they aim to achieve different things. 
 
Where health authorities are concerned different considerations may arise to those in 
cases involving other public authority defendants. Smith was a case involving the 
police and the policy considerations that prevented liability were in part specific to the 
police and the functions that they perform. The majority affirmed the concern in 
Brooks that imposing a duty would result in defensive practice amongst the police 
meaning that they would not carry out their functions as efficiently.93 Concerns over 
defensive practice have also been raised in cases involving health authorities; 
however, these concerns have been dismissed, as health authorities can already be 
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liable in negligence.94 Where health authorities are the defendants, factors affecting 
breach are more likely to affect which claim is made. For example, if the claim is 
brought under the HRA 1998 then the court will have to consider wider factors such 
as other Convention rights and the proportionality of the defendant’s actions, whereas 
if the claim is brought in negligence then only the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
actions will be considered. It has been argued that breach of Article 2 will therefore 
be harder to show than negligence, making it easier for the defendants.95 However, 
there are also benefits to bringing an action against a health authority under the HRA 
1998, for example a wider class of victims can now claim. This can be particularly 
beneficial for claimants, as it was in Rabone, as it allows parents of an adult child to 
make a claim, which they would not be able to do in negligence.96 
 
It is, nonetheless, acknowledged that even if the two actions were developed to 
become more consistent there will still be benefits to pursuing one action over the 
other. For example, there is a shorter limitation period for actions brought under the 
HRA 1998,97 but at the same time a wider class of victims can claim under the HRA 
1998 than in negligence.98 It was argued in Smith that the common law should not be 
developed to become more consistent with ECHR law because any ‘perceived 
shortfall in the way that is [the common law] deals with cases that fall within the 
threshold for the application of the Osman principle can now be dealt with in 
domestic law under the 1998 Act’.99 However, at present where some claims are 
concerned there is no real choice between actions, for example if an action against the 
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police was brought outside of the one-year limitation period of the HRA 1998 then 
the claimants would have no choice but to bring it under the common law only to face 
the ‘longstanding policy arguments’100 that continue to prevent claims against the 
police in negligence. If the law were developed, however, claimants would still have 
to determine which action would be best to claim under, however, having a consistent 
duty stage for each would provide the benefit of meaning that the claimant does not 
suffer simply because ‘the claim is brought 10 months after or 14 months after the 
acts complained of.’101  
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the law currently maintains a distinction between actions under the 
HRA 1998 and those in negligence. This is in part based on functional differences 
between the two,102 and also based on the procedural differences that exist between 
the two actions, for example differing limitation periods and remedies. However, it is 
argued that there are similarities between the two and that in order to provide better 
protection for claimants, the two should, in part, be developed together so that they 
are not contradictory. Whilst the functional differences mean that the breach stage and 
remedies should remain different, as substantive rights raise different issues to 
remedies,103 where the duty stage is concerned the two should be more 
complimentary. In relation to the duties owed, regardless of which action is brought, 
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‘[t]he two rely on the same facts and, essentially, the same considerations arise’104 and 
so there is little reason for maintaining such a distinction. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The decision in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust1 has had a large impact on the law 
relating to the operational duty, especially where health authorities are concerned. The 
decision widened the duty by finding that it applies to voluntary, as well as detained, 
patients and also increased the class of victims that can claim under the duty. Critics 
have suggested that this decision will result in the duty applying too widely and will 
lead to an increase in litigation;2 however, it has been argued that this is not 
necessarily true. While the operational duty has become wider following Rabone due 
to the focus on vulnerability, this decision should be welcomed as it provides greater 
protection for patients and removes these ‘artificial’3 distinctions between voluntary 
and detained patients. As critics have highlighted, vulnerability was not properly 
defined in Rabone and remains vague as a concept,4 yet if it is defined properly then it 
can be applied specifically to health authorities and the duty can still be applied 
narrowly and effectively.  
 
By removing the emphasis on control, it can be argued that the factors that trigger the 
duty should vary depending on the public authority and the function that they 
perform. The result is firstly that the duty will not apply to all public authorities, 
instead it will depend on their function and their relationship with victims. Secondly, 
it will mean that in cases involving other public authorities different factors will be 
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important, for example where prison services are involved factors such as detention 
and control will be relevant, for example as in Keenan v United Kingdom,5 but where 
health authorities are concerned vulnerability will be the important factor. The current 
jurisprudence on vulnerability comes from cases involving detention, for example 
Keenan, and so does not necessarily apply to vulnerability in the context of health 
authorities. Where these scenarios are concerned vulnerability can be defined more 
precisely as resulting from a psychical or psychiatric condition meaning that the 
patient cannot protect themselves, either from third-party harm or self-harm. 
Vulnerability is therefore coupled with a dependence upon the health authority for 
protection and these two factors together engage the operational duty. Once this first 
factor has been shown, the Osman test will then apply to determine if the duty is 
engaged. This will provide an additional control over the duty and will prevent it from 
applying too widely as it will be hard to show a real and immediate risk.6 Finally, 
even if this is shown and the duty is engaged, the claimant will then have to prove 
breach of the duty, another high threshold for the claimant to pass.7 When 
determining whether there has been a breach of the operational duty the courts will 
have to consider whether the public authority did all that they reasonably could to 
prevent the risk. This includes taking into consideration the available resources, 8 and 
other Convention rights. This requirement of proportionality prevents the duty from 
applying too widely and means that not every risk must be protected against and so 
avoids placing ‘an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.’9 
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The growth of the operational duty has also raised questions over the relationship 
between actions brought under the HRA 1998 and actions against public authorities 
for breach of a positive duty of care. The UK courts have maintained a distinct 
separation between the two, asserting that both fulfil different functions and so the 
common law does not need to be developed in line with ECHR law.10 Rather than 
continue to maintain this rigid distinction, it is argued that the duty stage of actions 
against public authorities for breach of a positive duty of care should be developed to 
become more consistent with that under the HRA 1998, as there are already 
similarities between the two.11 This would help to remedy the current inconsistencies 
that exist between the two actions, for example why a duty may be held to exist under 
the HRA 1998, but not at common law. It is acknowledged, however, that the 
differing functions and aims of each action mean that the two need to remain separate 
where the breach stages and remedies are concerned.  
  
Finally, the relationship between the investigatory and operational duty has been 
considered, as there is currently a lack of clarity over the investigatory duty. The 
investigatory duty imposed by Article 2 is currently very vague as the duty has only 
been described in a very general way by the ECtHR. This has the benefit of flexibility 
and enables it to adapt to new scenarios, however, it does raise problems when the 
duty is implemented by member states and results in a disparity between the two. 
There is currently a lack of clarity over a number of issues; including what kind of 
investigation should be carried out and what results are required. The UK 
jurisprudence is somewhat clearer as the courts apply the duty specifically to public 
authorities, as organs of the state, yet there is still a lack of clarity over the scope of 
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the duty, what type of investigation should be carried out and what results are 
required. It is argued that the duty should be tailored to each public authority in order 
to provide more guidance on how it should be implemented. One way to do this 
would be to create a body within each public authority that would be responsible for 
discharging the duty, for example by beginning the investigation, reporting the death 
to the coroner and implementing any recommendations. This would help to remedy 
the ad hoc way in which the duty is currently carried out. 
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